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- Charm Industrial | Giving Green
Charm Industrial // BACK This recommendation was last updated in November 2022, with pricing details updated in May 2023. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We do not have plans to update this recommendation in the foreseeable future as we have paused our work assessing direct carbon removal and offset projects. Questions and comments are welcome. Giving Green believes that donating to our top recommendations is likely to be the most impactful giving strategy for supporting climate action. However, we recognize that contributing to policy advocacy (as most of these recommendations do) may not be tenable for all donors, especially businesses. Taking this into consideration, we recommend Charm Industrial specifically for businesses given its focus on carbon removal and more direct alignment with corporate net-zero ambitions. We believe Charm Industrial to be a high-impact option, but we are unsure of the extent to which its cost-effectiveness approaches that of our top recommendations. Overview of Charm Industrial Mechanism Causality Project Additionality Marginal Additionality Permanence Cost Co-benefits and potential adverse effects Conclusion Overview of Charm Industrial Charm Industrial is a US-based company that converts agriculture residues into bio-oil through a process known as fast pyrolysis. Charm collects agriculture residues (such as corn stover and wheat straw) from farmers in Kansas, as well as forestry operators and wildlife prevention organizations in California. [1] These are fed into a pyrolysis unit and heated at very high temperatures (> 500° C) in the absence of oxygen for a matter of seconds, creating bio-oil. Instead of slowly decomposing and releasing greenhouse gases, the bio-oil locks up the carbon from the original biomass and is injected into EPA-regulated wells, sinking to the bottom of the geological formation where it remains for thousands or millions of years. Charm’s business model is currently entirely dependent on the sale of removals to individual and corporate buyers. The company uses these funds to build small, mobile pyrolysis units at its factory in San Francisco or purchase pyrolysis units that can be deployed near farms or in forestry settings where agriculture or forestry residues are collected. Charm’s theory of change is that using modular, distributed pyrolysis units instead of centralized biomass processing plants can help drive down capital and transportation costs over time. Lower costs would make this technology more affordable in combating climate change, and make biomass residues economically accessible for use. The use of biomass feedstocks as a climate mitigation strategy has traditionally been associated with using biomass for energy production (bioenergy). However, as interest in removals has increased and the cost of other renewable energy technologies like solar and wind have decreased, more emphasis has been placed on the carbon value of biomass and the potential for long-term storage. This pathway is known as biomass carbon removal and storage (BiCRS). Its proponents believe it will play an important role in global efforts to achieve net-zero emissions, and that it has global potential to capture and store 2.5 gigatons of CO 2 annually by mid-century. Having sequestered thousands of tons of carbon to date, Charm is a pioneer in actively demonstrating how to scale up this important climate mitigation pathway responsibly and sustainably. Mechanism Giving Green views the bio-oil production process as removed emissions, though we acknowledge this can be a gray area depending on which parts of the process are considered. As crops grow, they draw carbon out of the atmosphere and store it in their biomass. Charm’s process intercepts agricultural residues left behind after harvest before the biomass can decompose and re-emit carbon, heating the residue to create a highly stable product called bio-oil. As this cycle is a carbon-negative process, resulting in less CO 2 in the atmosphere overall, we consider these emissions as removed rather than avoided. Causality High causality. Charm collects agriculture residues that would have otherwise been left on the field and broken down by microorganisms. This process of decomposition would return some of the nutrients from the residues back into the soil, but would have also resulted in the release of greenhouse gases including CO 2 and nitrous oxide. Heating up these agriculture residues through fast pyrolysis locks much of this carbon into place in the form of bio-oil, which is then injected into EPA-regulated injection wells. Heating up biomass through the process of pyrolysis creates an end product that is much more difficult for bacteria and microbes to break down, resulting in lower CO 2 emissions. The carbon content of the bio-oil that is injected underground is easily measurable, making it possible to accurately quantify carbon reductions because of the process. Project Additionality High project additionality. Charm’s only revenue stream is from the sale of carbon removals to individual and corporate buyers. Unlike other companies that convert biomass into biochar or bio-oil through pyrolysis, the company does not sell the end product for commercial uses. While the fast pyrolysis process also produces a small amount of biochar, this is returned to the field for the nutrient value and is not included as part of the purchasable removals. Based on our research and conversations with Charm, there is a strong case that the bio-oil would not be produced and injected into wells without revenues from the sale of removals. Compared to conventional fuels, bio-oil has a lower energy density and higher viscosity and easily hardens on contact with air. In the absence of additional refining, these properties make it a poor substitute for conventional fossil fuels. Charm has determined that bio-oil has potentially greater value as a carbon store than an energy carrier and has therefore pursued a commercialization path that depends entirely on revenues from the sale of removals. This may change in the future, as the cost of the process comes down. The company is hopeful that once the price reaches $250/ton of CO 2 , the company may be eligible for revenues from federal 45Q and state LCFS incentives and crediting systems. At the <$100/ton range, the company expects to be exploring commercial use cases, like the production of industrial syngas or iron for use in steelmaking. For the foreseeable future, we assess Charm’s process as high project additionality. Marginal Additionality High marginal additionality. According to the company, a single pyrolysis unit is approximately the size of a shipping container. One of these units can capture (as bio-oil) the equivalent of several thousand tons of CO 2 annually. Charm’s revenue from the sale of removals will go toward operational costs and the procurement of these pyrolysis units that are small and mobile enough to be moved along the boundary of farmlands, reducing the costs associated with transporting biomass feedstock. [2] We consider this to be a modular system that lends itself well to high marginal additionality. Charm was able to walk us through how new removal revenues contribute to procurement and deployment of new pyrolysis units that become increasingly mobile and cost-effective over time. Permanence High Permanence. The bio-oil produced through Charm’s pyrolysis process is more stable than the original biomass. This is true for other products created through pyrolysis like biochar. However, biochar is typically applied to soils, where it undergoes complex interactions with soil microbes and other microorganisms and is further affected by environmental conditions and soil properties. This makes it difficult to measure real-world biochar decomposition rates – and, in turn, the permanence or durability of carbon fixed to the biochar. Charm has attempted to avoid this problem by injecting the resulting bio-oil into EPA-regulated injection wells. Injection wells are “used to place fluids underground into porous geologic formations”. Charm claims that the highly viscous bio-oil sinks to the bottom of the well and solidifies over time, eliminating any chance that the carbon locked in the bio-oil could be re-released into the atmosphere. The wells used are regulated by the EPA under the Underground Injection Control program to ensure that injection activities do not endanger underground sources of drinking water. The over 680,000 injection wells in the United States have a number of uses including disposing of brine generated during oil production, disposal of other liquid wastes, and storing carbon dioxide. These wells must be rigorously separated from underground sources of drinking water; once filled, they are capped by an impermeable cap rock called the “confining layer.” Charm has conducted initial studies comparing bio-oil before and after injection that demonstrate the bio-oil solidifies within 48 hours. Testing and monitoring programmes are currently underway for in-field bio-oil solidification; Charm will share these results once available. [3] Given the high stability of bio-oil relative to existing biomass, and the sinking of bio-oil thousands of feet below the surface, we assess permanence as high. We also note that Charm is working with Carbon Direct and EcoEngineers to create a bio-oil sequestration protocol [4] to develop life cycle analyses, carbon management, and monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards for bio-oil projects on the voluntary and regulatory carbon markets. Cost When considering the price per ton of CO 2 removed, Charm does not seem to be among the most cost-effective options on the voluntary carbon market: it currently costs hundreds of dollars per ton, depending on the purchaser's commitment duration, to remove a ton of CO 2 through Charm. However, we believe that comparing costs directly can be misleading and that the true value of purchasing a removal from Charm extends beyond the tons removed. Investing in Charm offers long term durability (10,000+ years) of stored carbon as well as support for the development of carbon removal technology and markets. Much of Charm’s cost is associated with the development and deployment of pyrolysis units and the transportation of biomass feedstock to pyrolysis units. The company expects that removal purchases made today will help mass-manufacture pyrolysis units to reduce unit costs, capitalize on internal supply chain efficiencies, and reduce biomass transportation costs by developing and deploying more mobile pyrolysis units. While current costs are high, the company has a roadmap for bringing costs down in the coming years. Co-benefits and potential adverse effects High co-benefits. Charm has identified multiple co-benefit streams: wildfire reduction, abandoned well leak prevention, and economic benefits to local communities. While there could be the risk of leakage associated with bio-oil storage, we believe that this is unlikely. [5] The company also aims to reduce the risk of wildfire by strategically collecting forest slash to minimize forest fuel load. Reducing the frequency and intensity of wildfires also increases air quality, which has flow-on impacts to the health of the local communities. [6] There are hundreds of thousands of abandoned oil and gas wells across the US slowly leaking toxic chemicals and methane. Charm can utilize these wells for bio-oil storage and then permanently cap them while actively engaging with local environmental justice communities in the area. [7] Further, Charm's technology provides employment and additional income for farmers, forest managers, and fuel injection operators, bringing direct benefits to groups who might otherwise be opposed to aggressive climate action. [8] A share of the purchase price also goes towards third parties, such as farmers or fuel injection operators. [9] We have identified one potential adverse effect. It is important to note the potential risks with the structural integrity or leakage of injection wells. However, the bio-oil is expected to solidify shortly after injection into its storage point thousands of feet below water tables. The EPA has determined risks to be low, and far more buoyant materials including CO 2 gas have been injected into geologic formations for decades without issue. We therefore believe that risks associated with injecting bio-oils must be monitored, but are not disqualifying in any way. Conclusion Charm has developed and is beginning to scale up a process that can measurably and permanently keep CO 2 from agriculture and forest residues from entering the atmosphere. It avoids some of the permanence and additionality concerns associated with biochar providers. It has made the purchase process streamlined for purchasers of removals, and is currently working on a public dashboard to further improve transparency. The company's process is measurable, additional, and permanent. The only drawbacks are its current price and the need for more data on the solidification of bio-oil in injection wells. We have determined that supporting Charm Industrial at this juncture can have a significant effect on scaling up its climate mitigation solution by reducing costs and helping improve its technology. More broadly, this can help shape a relatively new climate mitigation pathway. You can pre-purchase removals from Charm Industrial on its website with expected fulfillment by 2026 (at time of writing). We thank Peter Reinhardt, CEO of Charm Industrial, and Harris Cohn, Sales Lead at Charm Industrial, for the conversations that informed this document. Endnotes [1] “operating in forestry areas and utility wildfire operation in California.” Charm Industrial call notes, 2022-10-27; “Charm will…help reduce the intensity and scale of wildfires.” Charm, 2022. [2] “Funding goes towards operations, as well as the new modular pyrolysis machines.” Charm Industrial call notes, 2022-10-27 [3] “We have a petroleum engineer to design testing and monitoring programmes and will share results when available.” Charm Industrial call notes, 2022-10-27 [4] A new proto-protocol for bio-oil sequestration. https://www.carbon-direct.com/insights/a-new-proto-protocol-for-bio-oil-sequestration [5] See “Community Benefits” section. Charm, 2022 . [6] See “Taming Wildfires” subheading. Charm, 2022 . [7] See “Fixing Abandoned Wells” subheading. Charm, 2022 . [8] See “Economic Opportunities for Agricultural and Rural Communities” and “A Just Transition For Energy Communities” subheadings. Charm, 2022 . [9] Email correspondence with Charm Industrial, 2023-05-04
- Nuclear Innovation Alliance | Giving Green
Nuclear Innovation Alliance // BACK Overview The Giving Green Fund plans to award a grant to the Nuclear Innovation Alliance (NIA), a US-based think-and-do tank, to support its work on nuclear policy advocacy. We are supporting an ecosystem of nonprofits working on policies to support advanced nuclear innovation in the US, given that the US is important for designing and demonstrating these technologies before they are exported elsewhere. NIA falls within our philanthropic strategy of supporting nuclear power as a way to diversify energy portfolios. Please see Giving Green’s deep dive report on nuclear power for more information, including risks and potential co-benefits, recommended sub-strategies, theory of change, funding need, and key uncertainties. Last updated: October 2024 What is NIA? NIA is a think-and-do tank that supports research, development, and deployment (RD&D) of advanced nuclear technologies. Its core program areas include Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing reform, bipartisan federal and state policy, investment and entrepreneurship (e.g., Nuclear Innovation Bootcamp ), and deep decarbonization. NIA was founded in 2015 as a spin-off from Clean Air Task Force. What are we funding at NIA, and how could it help reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Nuclear power can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by replacing or avoiding carbon-emitting energy sources. It can work alongside renewable energy by providing a steady electricity supply, regardless of the season or environmental conditions. The future of advanced nuclear reactors, which are designed to be lower cost to build than traditional nuclear reactors and to have advanced safety features, depends on technological progress and political conditions. A key focus of NIA’s current work is on modernizing licensing at NRC, which can quicken the pace for innovation and accelerate deployment. It is also working to catalyze early-mover nuclear projects by implementing existing nuclear policy wins and engaging with stakeholders on derisking nuclear investments. We think NIA’s work helps address key obstacles to building new nuclear plants. NIA plans to use additional funding to scale its operations. It is interested in hiring staff to assess what is needed to integrate nuclear power into industrial decarbonization and meet increased electricity demand from the tech industry. Its new hire(s) will also engage with policymakers and external stakeholders on federal and state policy changes. Why do we think NIA will use this funding well? NIA has informed and advocated for various nuclear energy policies that have been passed, including tax credits for advanced nuclear reactors in the Inflation Reduction Act and various measures related to licensing in both the ADVANCE Act and the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act. Based on conversations we have had with others in the nuclear policy ecosystem, we think that NIA has found its niche in producing highly quantitative technical analysis and developing bipartisan policy recommendations. We think NIA has the capacity to grow its operations and could become more impactful with increased resources. For more on the difference between the grantees of the Giving Green Fund and our Top Nonprofits, please see this blog post on the Giving Green Fund. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.
- Nuclear Power | Giving Green
Nuclear Power // BACK This report was last updated in January 2023. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes. Table of contents Executive Summary What is nuclear power? How could nuclear power reduce greenhouse gases? Nuclear power can provide electricity at all times. Diversified power systems are more feasible and less costly than relying entirely on renewables. How do we increase nuclear power? Overview Keeping traditional nuclear reactors open Scaling up traditional nuclear reactors Innovating and supporting advanced nuclear reactors Theory of change for advanced nuclear reactor deployment in the US Examining the assumptions behind nuclear power’s theory of change What is nuclear power’s cost-effectiveness? Is there room for more funding? Are there major co-benefits or adverse effects? Key uncertainties and open questions Bottom line / next steps Executive Summary What is nuclear power? Nuclear power uses nuclear reactions (i.e., fission, fusion, and decay) to generate electricity. Nuclear power provides around 10 percent of the global electricity supply. There has recently been increased focus on advanced nuclear reactors that are designed to be safer and cheaper than traditional nuclear reactors. How could nuclear power reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Nuclear power can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if it replaces or avoids dirtier energy sources. We think the most promising and large-scale GHG reduction opportunity comes from nuclear power’s ability to complement renewable energy sources by providing a steady source of electricity regardless of seasonal or environmental factors. Additionally, some types of advanced nuclear reactors can be used to decarbonize heavy industry. Theory of change: Nonprofits have supported advanced nuclear reactor research, development, and deployment (RD&D) through US policy advocacy, community engagement, licensing reform, and technical assistance. These inputs can help establish a more predictable path for licensing, increase federal funding and support, and decrease community opposition to nuclear projects. These factors influence whether companies can profitably scale advanced nuclear reactors. A successful deployment model in the US and reduced costs could have international spillover effects, such as through exports and leasing. What is nuclear power’s cost-effectiveness? We developed a highly subjective rough guess cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to estimate the costs and effects of nonprofits’ efforts on increasing advanced nuclear reactor deployment. We believe this CEA may underestimate the impact of advanced nuclear reactors on emissions because it only focuses on US deployment and does not account for international spillover effects. We have low confidence in this CEA and do not think it should be taken literally, but generally view it as a positive input to our overall assessment of nuclear power. Is there room for more funding? Advocacy for advanced nuclear reactor RD&D in the US is relatively neglected and probably has room for more funding. Are there major co-benefits or adverse effects? Nuclear power is less land-intensive than other sources of energy. Also, per unit of electricity generated, it is safer than fossil fuels and about as safe as wind and solar. Adverse effects include nuclear waste disposal, environmental and procedural justice concerns, and potential safety and nuclear proliferation risks. Key uncertainties and open questions: The cost-competitiveness of advanced nuclear reactors is uncertain, and nuclear power may not be a large part of a future carbon-free energy mix. There are also some open questions about where to best direct philanthropic funds to support advanced nuclear reactors (e.g., innovation in the US versus other countries). Bottom line / next steps: We believe support for US advanced nuclear reactor research, development, and deployment could be cost-effective in driving down emissions. What is nuclear power? Nuclear energy is energy in the core, or nucleus, of an atom. Nuclear power uses nuclear reactions to produce electricity. We focus on nuclear fission because most electricity from nuclear power is due to fission instead of fusion or decay. Nuclear fission generates continuous electricity by splitting atoms in a reactor to heat water into steam, which turns a turbine to produce electricity. [1] Nuclear power accounts for around 20% of electricity generation in advanced economies and 10% globally. [2] Some countries have been phasing it out due to public opposition and safety concerns. [3] Traditional large-scale nuclear power plants require intensive regulatory approval and have had high up-front costs (often with cost overruns) and long construction periods. [4] Our understanding is that there has been a shift in focus by governments and companies from traditional nuclear reactors to advanced nuclear reactors, which can be smaller, safer, and cheaper to build. [5] How could nuclear power reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Traditional and advanced nuclear reactors could reduce GHG emissions if they replace or avoid dirtier energy sources (e.g., coal-fired or natural gas power plants). [6] We think the most promising and large-scale GHG reduction opportunity comes from nuclear power’s ability to complement renewables because, unlike wind and solar, nuclear power can produce steady electricity regardless of seasonal or environmental factors. [7] Some advanced nuclear reactors’ high-temperature steam can also yield hydrogen gas, which can be used as an energy source. [8] Also, industrial processes that require fossil fuels to create high heat can use certain types of advanced reactors instead. [9] Nuclear power can provide electricity at all times. Nuclear power is not a silver bullet for low-carbon electricity, but it can help lower greenhouse gas emissions by reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Namely, nuclear reactors can operate for a long duration and meet electricity demand at scale across all seasons. Also, as a dispatchable source of electricity, reactors can be turned on and off and meet changing electricity demands. Wind and solar cannot provide these same benefits because they are constrained by weather, while batteries and smart charging are constrained by duration. Geothermal and hydropower share some of the same benefits as nuclear power, but our understanding is that they face greater geographical constraints than nuclear power. Indeed, people sometimes replace retired nuclear reactors with fossil fuels instead of renewables. For example, natural gas-fired and coal generation increased in Florida after the Crystal River Nuclear Plant shut down in 2009. [10] Likewise, Germany, which began phasing out nuclear power in 2011, addressed its energy crisis in 2022 by reopening coal plants and boosting renewables. [11] Diversified power systems are more feasible and less costly than relying entirely on renewables. While we believe global decarbonization is theoretically possible without nuclear power, we think this approach is more costly and challenging to implement. [ 12] Importantly, nuclear power uses the least amount of land per unit of electricity compared to other energy sources (Figure 1) [13] . Because wind and solar power systems have a large footprint, a grid that depends solely on wind and solar requires a greater total installed capacity than more diversified power systems. [ 14] We think the large footprint of renewables likely becomes more of a concern as their deployment scales. For example, US communities have disagreed on whether developers should use land to expand wind and solar power. We suspect this will continue to be the case as the country transitions its grid to cleaner energy sources. [ 15] Our take is that a diversified clean energy portfolio hedges against the risk of any specific technology failing. Figure 1: Land use of energy sources per unit of electricity. Also, because wind and solar are intermittent, they need backup energy and/or long-duration seasonal energy storage. [ 16] Furthermore, wind and solar require a major expansion of long-distance transmission grids so that people who live in areas less suited for renewables can use electricity generated from far away. [ 17] These combined factors increase the cost of a 100 percent renewable portfolio compared to one that includes nuclear power. [ 18] For example, Frew et al. (2016) found that a 100 percent renewable portfolio standard would be twice the cost of one that was 80 percent based on renewables. [ 19] It is our impression that working on nuclear power alongside renewables diversifies our low-carbon electricity generation options and reduces the risk of failing to transition away from fossil fuels. How do we increase nuclear power? Overview Interventions for increasing nuclear power include keeping traditional nuclear reactors open, scaling up traditional nuclear reactors, and supporting advanced nuclear reactors. Of the three, we believe supporting advanced nuclear reactors to be the most promising in terms of scale, feasibility, and funding need. Keeping traditional nuclear reactors open The number of traditional nuclear power plants has decreased in the US since the 1990s, dropping from 112 in 1990 to 93 in 2021. [ 20] Nonprofits have sought to keep nuclear reactors open in the US through insider and outsider policy advocacy tactics. For example, Third Way Institute has advocated for nuclear production tax credits, and organizations such as Moms for Nuclear, Generation Atomic, and Campaign for a Green Nuclear Deal have conducted grassroots outreach. [ 21] As of November 2022, our take is that keeping nuclear reactors open in the US is important, but we have not prioritized it because it may be well-covered under recently passed bills. For example, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) includes the Civil Nuclear Credit Program (CNC), a $6B investment that can support continued operations. Nuclear plants at risk of closing also benefit from production tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and can apply for future funding rounds from the CNC. [ 22] There are likely opportunities to keep reactors open in other countries. For example, some countries–such as Belgium, Germany, and South Korea–that had committed to phasing out nuclear power have chosen to delay closures to address energy crises or reduce emissions. [ 23] We have yet to investigate nuclear reactor closures in depth for non-US countries, partly due to possible restrictions related to our 501(c)(3) status and our comparative advantage on US-based issues. We may visit this in the future. Scaling up traditional nuclear reactors Traditional nuclear reactors in the US Traditional nuclear reactor construction in the US has faced significant cost run-ups and delays. For example, costs associated with the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant are expected to exceed $30B, when its original cost estimate was $14B. Additionally, the plant was intended to become operational in 2016, but it will not generate electricity until at least 2023. [ 24] Cost overruns and delays in the US have been associated with increased regulations after nuclear disasters. For example, after the Three Mile Island accident, nuclear reactors’ overnight construction cost and construction time escalated to meet new safety procedures and requirements. [ 25] Additional factors that have impacted cost and scale-up include utility deregulation, which made large plants less favorable; construction management issues; and opposition to nuclear power. [ 26] We are not optimistic about philanthropic opportunities for scaling traditional nuclear reactors in the US primarily because we are concerned about their high cost. We have deprioritized this intervention primarily due to tractability concerns. Traditional reactors outside the US It is not a foregone conclusion that nuclear power has to be expensive. One study found that while nuclear construction costs increased in the US after the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979, prices were fairly stable in France, Japan, and Canada. At the same time, nuclear costs went down in South Korea. [ 28] Costs in France may have been stable over time because of construction efficiencies (e.g., using the same few nuclear reactor designs repeatedly) and a less adversarial regulatory process than in the US. [ 29] South Korea had similar efficiencies, benefited from importing other countries’ designs, and had a single utility to oversee construction. [ 30] We believe constructing traditional nuclear reactors in other countries could be promising. For example, coal-reliant countries like Poland may want to transition to clean domestic energy sources before advanced nuclear reactors come online. [ 31] In addition, China and India—both of which have a growing annual share of global CO2 emissions—have increased their nuclear power capacity over time. [ 32] We have yet to investigate opportunities for scaling traditional nuclear reactors outside the US, largely because we are unfamiliar with nonprofits working on this. We may look into this in the future. Innovating and supporting advanced nuclear reactors What are advanced nuclear reactors? Engineers have designed advanced nuclear reactors to be safer, cheaper, more flexible, more efficient, and easier to deploy than traditional nuclear reactors. Their capacity ranges from 15MWe to 1,500MWe; in comparison, the smallest operating traditional nuclear plant in the US has a maximum capacity of about 580 MWe. [ 33] Small advanced nuclear reactors can be standardized and constructed in factories, which could enable “learning by doing” and drive down costs. [ 34] Many advanced nuclear reactors also include passive safety measures, which can help prevent accidents. [ 35] Some advanced nuclear reactors are designed to be more efficient than traditional nuclear reactors, requiring less fuel to produce electricity and generating less waste. [ 36] Advanced nuclear reactors are still under development and have not been widely deployed. They face economic challenges such as high development and construction costs for first-of-a-kind reactors, and high operating costs. [ 37] Giving Green’s take on supporting advanced nuclear reactor innovation and deployment in the US Our take is that supporting research, development, and deployment (RD&D) of advanced nuclear reactors in the US could lower costs and financial risks for companies. If companies reach a tipping point where they can profitably scale advanced nuclear, this would most likely increase production and deployment. Importantly, RD&D could have global implications. Namely, people could apply a proven model for advanced nuclear reactor deployment in the US elsewhere. Additionally, cost reductions from accelerated progress could have international spillover effects by exporting and leasing technologies. We focus on the US because it is a major innovation site, and other countries could adopt its technological advances and deployment model. For example, we understand that licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is viewed as an international gold standard, so progress in licensing advanced nuclear reactors in the US could help other countries. Indeed, all of the experts we spoke to claimed that focusing philanthropic efforts on the US makes sense even with global deployment in mind. Additionally, Giving Green has a comparative advantage in understanding US policies as a US-based team. Given our limited research capacity, it made the most sense to target our efforts toward areas where we have an advantage. Of the different methods for increasing nuclear power, we find advocacy for advanced nuclear reactors to be the most promising in terms of importance, tractability, and neglectedness. However, this technology is still in the early stages of development. Therefore, our impression is that its success is not guaranteed and relies on technological progress, a supportive political environment, and community buy-in to operate. Nonprofits’ pathways for supporting advanced nuclear reactors After interviewing representatives from various nonprofits, speaking with funders and nuclear power experts, reviewing organizations’ websites, and reading papers, we identified several broader strategies that NGOs supporting advanced reactors seem to generally employ. Below, we describe these strategies that nonprofit organizations have employed to support advanced nuclear reactors, as well as provide a non-comprehensive list of organizations that have used this strategy: Legislative advocacy Example activities: Advocating for increased federal funding and support for advanced nuclear reactor RD&D. Examples of support include establishing demonstration sites, developing a domestic supply chain for enriched fuels, and designing financing mechanisms for exports. Policy research and education Example activities: Conducting research on advanced nuclear reactor development and deployment, writing policy recommendations, acting as thought leaders on emerging areas Community engagement Example activities: Engaging with communities and community leaders to address concerns and increase demand Licensing reform Example activities: Engaging with congressional oversight committees, providing technical and regulatory analysis, convening stakeholders, supporting other groups working on licensing reform Technical assistance Example activities: Identifying high-potential coal plants for conversion to nuclear power and developing digital tools and a kit to help coal plant owners reuse parts and infrastructure In 2022, we did not recommend a nonprofit focused on modernizing licensing because, based on our current understanding of licensing, we are not confident about its neglectedness and tractability relative to other funding opportunities. For example, we heard from climate stakeholders that many groups are already working on this, particularly from the industry side, and therefore do not think it is especially neglected. [ 38] Furthermore, one industry representative told us that nonprofits may need more influence to move the needle on licensing reform and that internal conversations between companies and NRC are more impactful. [ 39] Therefore, we believe nonprofits’ efforts to modernize licensing may be less tractable than other strategies for supporting advanced nuclear reactors. Though we think (1) licensing reform could be highly important in terms of reducing risks for companies and bringing advanced nuclear reactors to market sooner and (2) that nonprofits offer perspectives different from industry, we believe the marginal impact of donating to licensing reform efforts may be lower than other efforts supporting nuclear innovation. Theory of change for advanced nuclear reactor deployment in the US Overview Our impression is that successful advanced nuclear reactor deployment in the US requires an acceptable policy environment, commercial viability, an acceptable regulatory environment, and feasible implementation (e.g., community acceptance) ( Figure 2 ). US policy advocacy, community engagement, and technical assistance can improve these interrelated conditions. [ 40] For example, increased federal funding for RD&D in the US can lead to cost reductions and increased adoption in the US. Community engagement could also increase companies’ likelihood of profitably scaling advanced nuclear power. A US-based model could also have global implications through technological diffusion. We note that this theory of change is not stepwise, and the perceived future success of “downstream” nodes might influence upstream nodes. For example, commercial viability is most likely impacted by community buy-in. Figure 2: Theory of change for the influence of RD&D policy advocacy on emissions reductions. We explain why our approach may be less impactful in our open questions and key uncertainties section. Examining the assumptions behind nuclear power’s theory of change Below, we discuss and evaluate the assumptions related to the theory of change for advanced nuclear technologies. We rank whether we have low , medium , or high certainty about each assumption. [ 41] Importantly, a number of the stages of the theory of change are not amenable to easy measurement or quantification, or are expected to occur in the future but have yet to happen. We assess whether the best evidence, primary or secondary, for each assumption suggests whether it will plausibly hold. 1. There is an acceptable policy environment for advanced nuclear reactors in the US ( high certainty ). Our impression is that there is an acceptable policy environment for advanced nuclear reactors in the US. For example, legislators have demonstrated bipartisan support for nuclear technologies in the US with passed measures such as the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (2018), the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) (2019), and the Nuclear Energy Leadership Act , which was included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. [ 42] In addition, IIJA and IRA included tax credits for nuclear technologies. [ 43] Also, more than half of the US states have nuclear power in their plans to reduce carbon emissions from electricity generation. [ 44] Further signs of support include the recently lifted ban on nuclear power in West Virginia, the Diablo Canyon Power Plant’s extended life, and NRC’s intent to certify NuScale’s small modular reactor design. [ 45] Despite an overall friendly policy environment, our understanding is that progress on regulation has been slow. [ 46] 2. Advanced nuclear reactors can become commercially viable ( medium certainty ). Driving down advanced nuclear reactors’ costs Our take is that advanced nuclear reactors’ high costs may be overcome through increased production and deployment, as has been the case for solar and wind power. [ 47] In particular, standardized and factory-fabricated advanced nuclear reactors can take advantage of efficiency gains from “learning by doing” and economies of scale. We could be wrong if advanced nuclear reactors do not analogize to solar and wind power and are instead more similar to traditional nuclear reactors, which have, on average, increased in cost over time. [ 48] We do not believe this to be true because advanced nuclear reactors can be mass-produced, unlike traditional nuclear reactors. Cost-competitiveness with other energy sources Advanced nuclear reactors must be cost-competitive with other energy sources to be commercially viable. Currently, building new advanced nuclear plants is more expensive than other dispatchable substitutes, such as combined cycle plants (natural gas). [ 49] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the lifetime cost of building and deploying a combined cycle plant by 2027 costs about $40 per MWh. [ 50] The EIA estimates that building an advanced nuclear reactor would cost around $82 per MWh under those conditions. [ 51] A separate techno-economic assessment of GE-Hitachi’s small modular reactor (SMR, a type of advanced nuclear reactor with a power capacity of less than 300 MWe) estimates that it would operate in the range of $44 to $51 per MWh. NuScale SMRs would cost $51 to $54 per MWh. [ 52] Despite its higher cost, (1) nuclear power is the only low-emissions energy source that can provide uninterruptible electricity and be deployed widely, and (2) there are issues with scaling geothermal, solar, and wind power. We are cautiously optimistic about advanced nuclear reactors’ ability to compete with other energy sources, and acknowledge the uncertainty on how quickly advanced nuclear reactors can reduce costs, given its dependence on technological progress and political conditions. [ 53] Additional challenges that advanced nuclear reactors face include having a sufficient supply chain and workforce and a predictable licensing pathway. Our impression is that provisions in the IIJA and IRA (e.g., investments in a domestic supply chain for enriched fuels) address some supply chain concerns. [ 54] We explain uncertainties related to licensing in the following section. 3. An acceptable regulatory environment exists for advanced nuclear reactors ( medium certainty ). Licensing impacts how long it takes for reactors to reach the market. According to nuclear advocates, if the licensing procedure for advanced nuclear technologies is too long, this can threaten their long-term deployment and reduce customer interest. [ 55] NEIMA directed NRC to create a new licensing framework for advanced nuclear reactors that is more efficient than the existing framework designed for traditional nuclear reactors. [ 56] According to experts we have spoken to, ambiguities in the licensing framework need to be clarified, and the window of opportunity for modifying the framework is closing because rulemaking is set to be finalized by 2024. [ 57] Companies can still license their projects with existing procedures instead of going through this drafted framework, but there may still be major pitfalls and uncertainty over regulation. Overall, we think an acceptable regulatory environment can exist for advanced nuclear reactors because, while NRC can improve its licensing process, there are still pathways to getting licensed. 4. Implementing advanced nuclear reactors at scale in the US is feasible ( medium certainty ). Our take is that implementing advanced nuclear reactors at scale in the US is feasible but not guaranteed. For example, coordinated efforts against nuclear projects could delay construction and increase costs. Additionally, advanced nuclear reactors need sufficient long-term, guaranteed demand to enable mass production and economies of scale. We understand that not investing resources in building trust with communities and negotiating with stakeholders poses a risk to scaling nuclear technologies in the US. 5. Advanced nuclear reactors scaled in the US will increase the likelihood of global adoption ( high certainty ). We think US outputs in advanced nuclear reactor RD&D could increase adoption elsewhere by reducing costs, establishing regulatory standards, and having signaling effects. However, the impact of US outputs on nuclear adoption will not be globally uniform. For example, a study found that important historical factors that have influenced whether a country adopted nuclear power include: Electricity demand Domestic capacity for constructing nuclear power plants Dependence on imported oils Income level Economy size Proximity to early adopters [ 58] We believe some subset of these factors will also likely apply to advanced nuclear reactors. In addition, we are uncertain about the rate of technological diffusion and whether, at the margin, the US is the best site for investing in nuclear innovation. For example, we are uncertain about the extent to which the US can export advanced nuclear reactors globally due to its geopolitical nature. Namely, Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act requires agreements between the US and other countries on peaceful nuclear cooperation before any significant nuclear material or equipment transfer from the US. [ 59] What is nuclear power’s cost-effectiveness? As a rough plausibility check, we developed a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to estimate the costs and impacts of US policy efforts, community engagement, and technical assistance on deploying advanced nuclear reactors. We assumed these activities change the probability of whether advanced nuclear reactors are on a high- or low-innovation track. This CEA may underestimate the impact of advanced nuclear reactors on emissions because this model uses high-cost scenarios and only focuses on US deployment. We think efforts focused on US deployment would likely have international spillover effects, such as through exports and leasing (see “ Theory of change for advanced nuclear reactor deployment in the US ”). This CEA includes highly subjective guess parameters and should not be taken literally. In particular, we estimated the change in likelihood that advanced nuclear reactors would move from a low- to a high-innovation scenario due to advocacy efforts, the change in that probability that could be attributed to nonprofits, and the number of years that advocacy moves a high-innovation scenario forward compared to the counterfactual. We have low confidence in the ability of our CEA to estimate the cost-effectiveness of NGOs’ US policy advocacy, community engagement, and technical assistance but view it as a slight positive input into our overall assessment of supporting advanced nuclear reactors. [ 60] See below for a high-level explanation and the model for additional notes and citations. Costs: We estimated how much the six leading nonprofits advocating for US-focused advanced nuclear reactor policies, community engagement, and technical assistance spend each year on these activities. We assumed their work between 2022 and 2026 would influence whether advanced nuclear reactors are in a high- or low-innovation scenario. Therefore, we multiplied the total annual budget by the time spent on advocacy and arrived at a total cost of about $85M. Avoided GHG: Using the Breakthrough Institute’s “ Advancing Nuclear ” report, we estimated advanced nuclear reactors’ installed capacity from 2025 to 2050 under high- and low-innovation scenarios with different learning rates (e.g., how much the technology’s cost decreases with increased output). We calculated the difference in output between the two scenarios to estimate the additional electricity generated by nuclear power under the high-innovation case. We assumed that a percentage of this extra electricity would have been generated by natural gas instead of nuclear power under the counterfactual. We estimated avoided emissions by multiplying that percentage by the difference in output and natural gas’s emission factor. Effectiveness: We assumed that policy advocacy, community engagement, and technical assistance increase the likelihood of being in a high-innovation scenario by some small percentage (10 to 30 percent) and that a fraction of this work can be attributed to nonprofits. We further assumed that these activities advance progress that would have also eventually been achieved in the absence of these nonprofits (by 1 to 10 years). We estimated effectiveness by multiplying the change in probability by the percent change attributable to nonprofit advocacy, the number of years advanced, and the amount of avoided GHGs. Results: Our best guess is that US policy efforts avoid one tCO2e for around $6.17 (range: $2.06 to $61.68). We also developed a Guesstimate version of this CEA , allowing us to assign ranges of values and probability distributions for each input, and found similar results. Our model does not include benefits that would likely come from international spillover, which would increase overall cost-effectiveness. Is there room for more funding? Although nuclear power has received increased federal funding in recent years, our impression is that it is relatively neglected because many mainstream environmental organizations do not work on nuclear power. For example, there has been resistance to nuclear technologies from major environmental organizations—such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth—and some environmental justice groups, including the Climate Justice Alliance. [ 61] Nonprofit organizations that advocate for advanced nuclear reactors include the Breakthrough Institute , Clean Air Task Force , ClearPath , the Good Energy Collective , Nuclear Innovation Alliance , TerraPraxis , and Third Way . Are there major co-benefits or adverse effects? We detail nuclear power's co-benefits and adverse effects below. Co-benefits Less land-intensive than other energy systems – Nuclear power is less land-intensive than other energy systems and therefore poses fewer risks related to increased land use, such as trade-offs for food production, urban development, and conservation. Improved safety over fossil fuels – Compared to fossil fuel production, nuclear has led to fewer deaths per unit of electricity and is about as safe as wind and solar. [ 62] Adverse effects Nuclear waste and hazardous materials – Nuclear reactors produce radioactive waste that must be safely recycled or stored. [ 63] Some advanced nuclear reactors also use coolants that pose safety concerns related to reactivity, toxicity, or corrosiveness. [ 64] Effects on local ecology – Traditional nuclear power plants require 30 to 80 percent more cooling water than other power plants with similar outputs. [ 65] They can generate thermal pollution if they discharge heated water into the environment, such as lakes and oceans. Changes in water temperature impact dissolved oxygen concentrations and local ecology. It seems likely that advanced nuclear reactors that use cooling water will also cause thermal pollution, but we are uncertain about its extent. Environmental and procedural justice concerns – The employment, climate, and safety benefits of historical nuclear power plants in the US have disproportionately gone to whiter and wealthier communities. In contrast, adverse effects, such as occupational risks and community contamination related to mining, have most impacted marginalized communities. [ 66] We are uncertain of the extent to which these inequities will impact future nuclear projects. Safety risks – We think it is likely that, compared to the counterfactual, increasing the number of nuclear reactors in the world would increase the risk of meltdowns by increasing opportunities for errors. [ 67] However, advanced nuclear reactors often incorporate passive safety features (e.g., cooling the core when there is a loss of electricity) and inherent safety features (e.g., higher boiling points for coolants) that could reduce that risk. [ 68] According to the Congressional Research Service, safety risks are generally low for existing traditional nuclear reactors in the US. [ 69] Potential increased risk of nuclear proliferation – Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear materials and weapons by countries not recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (e.g., the US is a Nuclear Weapon State). [ 70] Whether advanced nuclear reactors increase or decrease that small risk depends on technical and policy choices and how people implement them. [ 71] For example, advanced nuclear reactors are often designed to make fuel and waste less accessible, but some produce concentrated wastes that could make it easier to create weapons-grade nuclear material. [ 72] We think it is likely that making nuclear power cheaper could increase proliferation risks by making nuclear materials more commonplace, which could increase opportunities for bad actors (e.g., theft along the supply chain, targets for sabotage). However, the increase in likelihood of proliferation is highly dependent on (a) where nuclear expands, (b) technological development, and (c) the efficacy of nonproliferation oversight. We will continue to monitor this, but we think that advanced nuclear is in an early enough stage that it would be preemptive and overly cautious to not support further development at this point because of future uncertain effects on proliferation. Key uncertainties and open questions The viability of advanced nuclear reactors – Advanced nuclear reactors’ future depends on technological progress and political conditions. High capital costs, risk premiums for first-of-a-kind generators, potentially high operating costs, and local resistance to nuclear projects are barriers to advanced nuclear reactor development and deployment. [ 73] Nuclear power may not be a large part of a future carbon-free energy mix. Cost of expanding renewables and battery storage versus nuclear power in the future – We think nuclear is a good bet because relying entirely on renewables is more expensive and challenging to implement than a diversified energy portfolio. However, the costs of renewables and battery storage have decreased over time. [ 74] We are especially likely to be wrong if there is a massive build-out of transmission in the US and batteries become cheap enough to store significant amounts of renewable energy for long periods. Uncertainty around focusing on the US – We are unsure whether focusing on advanced nuclear reactors solely in the US is the best use of philanthropic funds if we are most interested in expanding this technology globally. Other high-innovation countries working on advanced nuclear reactors include Canada, China, France, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. [ 75] Experts we spoke with have unanimously agreed that the most likely path to global deployment of advanced nuclear reactors goes through the US due to its innovation experience and gold-standard licensing process. However, most of these experts focus primarily on US advanced nuclear efforts. Rate of technological diffusion – It is unclear how quickly advanced nuclear technologies will diffuse from the US to other countries. Diffusion will likely depend on export agreements and country-specific factors, such as energy dependency. Likelihood of increased proliferation – Our impression is that expanded nuclear power could slightly increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation because it increases the availability of nuclear fuel, which, under some circumstances, could be refined into weapons-grade material by bad actors. Still, the magnitude of this increase is highly conditional on uncertain circumstances and could be close to zero. Our take is that this risk is low overall, so we still recommend nuclear power to reduce emissions. Bottom line / next steps We believe support for advanced nuclear reactor RD&D could be cost-effective in reducing GHG emissions. As part of our 2022 investigation into nuclear power, we developed a longlist of 50 organizations, shortlisted seven organizations, conducted shallow dives, and ultimately added one organization to our list of recommendations: Good Energy Collective . Our decision to recommend just one nuclear organization was challenging because there are several divergent high-potential strategies to support nuclear power, and several organizations are doing important work to implement these strategies. For more information, please see our deep dive report on Good Energy Collective . In 2023, we plan to continue assessing our uncertainties and update our research and recommendations as we learn more about the nuclear policy landscape and the nonprofits operating within it. Endnotes [1] “Nuclear energy comes from splitting atoms in a reactor to heat water into steam, turn a turbine and generate electricity.” "NEI - What is Nuclear Energy?" n.d. [2] “Nuclear power accounts for about 10% of electricity generation globally, rising to almost 20% in advanced economies.” "IEA - Nuclear" 2022. [3] “Some countries are phasing out nuclear plants due to public opposition and concerns over safety” "IEA - Nuclear" 2022. [4] “With large up-front costs and long lead times for projects” "IEA - Nuclear" 2022. Regulatory costs may be more difficult to quantify. We haven’t identified an objective source for this, but anecdotally note that the “center-right” American Action Forum estimates the average US nuclear power plant spends ~$8.6M/year on regulatory compliance: “The average nuclear power plant must comply with a regulatory burden of at least $8.6 million annually.” “ American Action Forum - The Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Regulation ” 2016. [5] For example: “The next generation of nuclear power plants, also called innovative advanced reactors, will generate much less nuclear waste than today’s reactors.” "IAEA - What is Nuclear Energy? The Science of Nuclear Power" 2022; Clean Air Task Force: Advanced Nuclear ; [6] Nuclear produces 3 tCO2e per GWh of electricity, compared to 820 for coal and 490 for natural gas. "Our World in Data - The safest energy sources are also the cleanest" 2022. [7] “Nuclear power plants contribute to electricity security in multiple ways. Nuclear plants help to keep power grids stable. To a certain extent, they can adjust their operations to follow demand and supply shifts. As the share of variable renewables like wind and solar photovoltaics (PV) rises, the need for such services will increase. Nuclear plants can help to limit the impacts from seasonal fluctuations in output from renewables and bolster energy security by reducing dependence on imported fuels.” Nuclear Power in a Clean Energy System – Analysis - IEA 2019 . [8] “And the reactors’ high-temperature steam could also yield significant amounts of hydrogen, a carbon-free alternative fuel to natural gas.” "Nuclear Power Gets New Push in U.S., Winning Converts" 2022 . [9] “Some advanced nuclear reactors produce high temperatures that can be used for industrial processes. Many industrial processes currently rely on fossil fuels to produce necessary heat levels, and advanced reactors could substitute for fossil fuels in processes that would be difficult to electrify. In this way, advanced reactors have the potential to help decarbonize industries that are currently heavily reliant on fossil fuels.” "Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101" 2021. [10] “As plant owners make the decision to retire nuclear plants, utilities must replace lost nuclear capacity with generation from other sources or import more electricity from neighboring states or countries. After the retirement of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station outside Los Angeles, California, natural gas-fired generation increased to offset lost nuclear generation and, at the time, relatively low hydroelectric generation. Natural gas made up most of the new generation in Florida as well, with a slight increase in coal generation after the shutdown of Crystal River. In Wisconsin, the bulk of Kewaunee’s generation was replaced by coal-fired generation. In Vermont, Vermont Yankee’s generation was replaced by increased electricity imports from Canada and surrounding states.” "EIA - Fort Calhoun becomes fifth U.S. nuclear plant to retire in past five years" 2016. [11] Nuclear phase-out: “Angela Merkel has committed to shutting down all of the country's nuclear reactors by 2022, a task said by one minister to be as mammoth as the project to reunite East and West Germany in 1990.” "Germany to shut all nuclear reactors" 2011. Coal and renewables: “Last week, the country’s parliament, with the backing of members of the Green Party in the coalition government, passed emergency legislation to reopen coal-powered plants, as well as further measures to boost the production of renewable energy. There would be no effort to restart closed nuclear power plants, or even reconsider the timeline for closing the last active reactors.” "A needed nuclear option for climate change" 2022. [12] “While it is theoretically possible to rely primarily (or even entirely) on variable renewable energy resources such as wind and solar, it would be significantly more challenging and costly than pathways that employ a diverse portfolio of resources. In particular, including dispatchable low-carbon resources in the portfolio, such as nuclear energy or fossil energy with carbon capture and storage (CCS), would significantly reduce the cost and technical challenges of deep decarbonization.” “ Deep Decarbonization Of The Electric Power Sector Insights From Recent Literature ” 2017. [13] Image from "How does the land use of different electricity sources compare?" 2022. [14] “Decarbonized power systems dominated by variable renewables such as wind and solar energy are physically larger, requiring much greater total installed capacity.” “ Deep Decarbonization Of The Electric Power Sector Insights From Recent Literature ” 2017. [15] “To meet these targets and increase overall renewable energy generation, states have been trying to streamline renewable energy facility siting regulations and permit processes as exemplified by New York's article 6 section 94C. Yet, local opposition to renewable energy development, particularly wind, solar and geothermal energy, across the US presents a significant obstacle to meeting [Renewable Portfolio Standards] goals.” Susskind et al 2022 . [16] “Wind and solar-heavy power systems require substantial dispatchable power capacity to ensure demand can be met at all times. This amounts to a “shadow” system of conventional generation to back up intermittent renewables… Without a fleet of reliable, dispatchable resources able to step in when wind and solar output fade, scenarios with very high renewable energy shares must rely on long-duration seasonal energy storage.” “ Deep Decarbonization Of The Electric Power Sector Insights From Recent Literature ” 2017. [17] “High renewable energy scenarios also envision a significant expansion of long-distance transmission grids.” “ Deep Decarbonization Of The Electric Power Sector Insights From Recent Literature ” 2017. [18] “High renewables scenarios are more costly than other options, due to the factors outlined above.” “ Deep Decarbonization Of The Electric Power Sector Insights From Recent Literature ” 2017. [19] “Two scenarios with RPS [renewable portfolio standard] targets from 20% to 100% for the US (peak load ∼729 GW) and California (peak load ∼62 GW) find each RPS target feasible from a planning perspective, but with 2× the cost and 3× the overgeneration at a 100% versus 80% RPS target.” Frew et al 2016 [20] “Number of nuclear power reactors in the United States from 1957 to 2021. 1990: 112, 2021: 93.” "Number of nuclear power reactors in the United States (U.S.) for selected years between 1957 and 2021" 2022. [21] Third Way: “The recently announced Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal includes a civil nuclear credit program to support at-risk units. However, it is recommended that we continue to pursue a nuclear production tax credit (PTC), as proposed by Sen. Cardin and Rep. Pascrell, in the tax section of a reconciliation package.” "Importance of Preserving Existing Nuclear" 2021. Moms for Nuclear: “To promote those goals Zaitz and Hoff talk to community groups and professional societies, they promote nuclear power on social media and generate conversations walking around their hometowns wearing t-shirts that say, "Why nuclear? Ask me." “ Why even environmentalists are supporting nuclear power today ” 2022. Generation Atomic: “Our mission is to energize and empower today’s generations to advocate for a nuclear future. Our team is working to change the culture and build a movement to support nuclear energy.” "About - Generation Atomic" n.d. Campaign for a Green New Deal: “The Campaign for a Green Nuclear Deal is a nationwide advocacy effort to articulate a new vision for nuclear growth as a way to regain American industrial capabilities and create dignified jobs in clean energy and manufacturing. By organizing and campaigning at the state level while building support nationally, we will change hearts and minds.” “ GND Campaign - Mission ” n.d. [22] “As Diablo Canyon highlights the limits and difficulty of navigating the Civil Nuclear Credit, the industry has praised the production tax credit included in the Inflation Reduction Act. The credit offers $3 per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity produced and sold, which can increase to $15 per MWh if certain wage standards are met, according to the bill… Some nuclear plants in limited situations—such as those struggling to operate in high-cost, high-price regions—may not see a benefit from the tax credit and choose to apply for future rounds of the CNC program.” "Nuclear’s $6 Billion Bailout Likely to Help Only Diablo Canyon" 2022. [23] Belgium: “The Belgian federal government postponed a planned phaseout of nuclear power Friday, citing "a chaotic geopolitical environment" as the war in Ukraine disrupts energy markets across the European Union.” “ Belgium delays nuclear phaseout amid war worries ” 2022. Germany: “Germany is to temporarily halt the phasing-out of two nuclear power plants in an effort to shore up energy security after Russia cut supplies of gas to Europe’s largest economy.” “ Germany to delay phase-out of nuclear plants to shore up energy security ” 2022. South Korea: “President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took office in May, has vowed to reverse former President Moon Jae-in's policy of phasing out nuclear power, a policy which was brought in after he assumed office in 2017, and followed the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan.” “ New energy policy reverses Korea's nuclear phase-out ” 2022. [24] New cost: “A nuclear power plant being built in Georgia is now projected to cost its owners more than $30 billion.” Original costs and delays: “When approved in 2012, the third and fourth reactors were estimated to cost $14 billion, with the first electricity being generated in 2016. Now the third reactor is set to begin operation in March 2023, and the fourth reactor is set to begin operation in December 2023.” “ Georgia nuclear plant’s cost now forecast to top $30 billion ” 2022. [25] “When the full cost experience of US nuclear power is shown with construction duration experience, we observe distinctive trends that change after the Three Mile Island accident. As shown in Fig. 3 in blue, reactors that received their operating licenses before the TMI accident experience mild cost escalation. But for reactors that were under construction during Three Mile Island and eventually completed afterwards, shown in red, median costs are 2.8 times higher than pre-TMI costs and median durations are 2.2 times higher than pre-TMI durations. Post-TMI, overnight costs rise with construction duration, even though OCC excludes the costs of interest during construction. This suggests that other duration-related issues such as licensing, regulatory delays, or back-fit requirements are a significant contributor to the rising OCC trend.” Lovering, Yip, and Nordhaus 2016 [26] Utility deregulation: “The wave of utility deregulation started in the 1970s disfavored large, expensive plants.” “ Why America abandoned nuclear power (and what we can learn from South Korea) ” 2016. Project management: “The recent experience of nuclear construction projects in the United States and Europe has demonstrated repeated failures of construction management practices in terms of their ability to deliver products on time and within budget.” “ The Future of Nuclear Energy in a Carbon-Constrained World ” 2018. Opposition to nuclear power: It seems likely that advocacy against nuclear power (e.g., lawsuits, demonstrations) has played a role in delays and increased costs. [28] “Nuclear construction costs in the US did spiral out of control, especially after the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979. But this wasn't universal. Countries like France, Japan, and Canada kept costs fairly stable during this period. And South Korea actually drove nuclear costs down, at a rate similar to what you see for solar.” “ Why America abandoned nuclear power (and what we can learn from South Korea) ” 2016. [29] “How did France pull this off? It helped that the country had only one utility (EDF) and one builder (Areva) working closely together. They settled on a few standard reactor designs and built them over and over again, often putting multiple reactors on a single site. That allowed them to standardize their processes and get better at finding efficiencies… France's regulatory process was also less adversarial than America's — and, for better or worse, doesn't allow legal intervention by outside groups once construction gets underway. After the Soviet Union's Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the government tweaked safety rules, leading to some delays. But costs didn't skyrocket like they did in the US after Three Mile Island.” “ Why America abandoned nuclear power (and what we can learn from South Korea) ” 2016. [30] “South Korea had an advantage in that it didn't start entirely from scratch. The country imported proven US, French, and Canadian designs in the 1970s and learned from other countries' experiences before developing its own domestic reactors in 1989. It developed stable regulations, had a single utility overseeing construction, and built reactors in pairs at single sites.” “ Why America abandoned nuclear power (and what we can learn from South Korea) ” 2016. [31] “Poland is betting nuclear power and offshore wind will help cut its dependence on coal, which it now uses for 70% of power production. The plan is to almost completely stop using coal by 2050, with nuclear energy and gas-fired units providing most of the stable supplies by then.” “ Poland May Look Beyond US for Nuclear Power Plant Partnership ” 2022. [32] Growing annual share of global CO2 emissions: China’s share of emissions was about 31% in 2020, while India’s is about 7 percent. Both appear to be on an upward trajectory. “ Our World in Data - Annual CO2 emissions ” 2020. China: “ Nuclear Power in China 2022. India: “ Nuclear Power in India ” 2022. [33] Advanced nuclear reactors: “Advanced reactor designs come in a wide range of sizes, from less than 15 MWe to 1,500 MWe or more.” “ Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues ” 2019. Smallest traditional nuclear plant in US: “The R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant in New York is the smallest nuclear power plant in the United States, and it has one reactor with a net summer electricity generating capacity of about 582 megawatts (MW).” “ EIA - Frequently Asked Questions ” 2022. [34] “While traditional reactors are constructed on site, many small advanced nuclear reactors can be constructed in a factory setting and transported to a site for quick installation. For some reactor types, factory construction would allow for large numbers of reactors to be manufactured and deployed much more quickly than traditional reactors, which may be essential to reaching low-carbon generation targets.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [35] “In many cases, they can also take advantage of passive safety measures, such as pressure relief valves, rather than relying on active safety features that require a backup power supply or human intervention to work. These passive safety measures allow reactors to withstand a broader set of accident conditions without causing damage.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [36] “Some advanced reactors use fuel much more efficiently than traditional reactors, converting up to 95 percent of the energy in the fuel to usable electricity (traditional reactors convert less than 5 percent). Therefore, they have the potential to provide energy using much less fuel… The increased energy efficiency of many advanced reactors also results in a smaller amount of nuclear waste.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [37] “Generally, the greatest inhibitors are substantial costs associated with the development and construction of first-of-a-kind reactors. These costs are inflated by risk premiums - uncertainty due to lack of mature deployment makes first-of-a-kind generators financially risky investments. Although some projections suggest that capital costs will be lower for mature advanced reactors than for traditional ones, it is also possible that there will be substantial capital costs associated with long and complex initial construction phases, creating a significant hurdle for adoption. Finally, even once advanced reactors are built again, they may still be relatively expensive to operate.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [38] Anonymized call notes on 2022-10-18a, 2022-10-18b, 2022-10-20, 2022-10-24. [39] Anonymized call notes on 2022-10-24. [40] We group legislative advocacy, policy research and education, and licensing reform under US policy advocacy. [41] We describe our certainty as low/medium/high to increase readability and avoid false precision. Since these terms can be interpreted differently, we use rough heuristics to define them as percentage likelihoods the assumption is, on average, correct. Low = 0-70%, medium = 70-90%, high = 90-100%. [42] Inclusion in National Defense Authorization Act: “U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, today thanked her colleagues for supporting the inclusion of S. 903, her Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (NELA), in S. 4049, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021. The Senate today passed the NDAA bill, with NELA incorporated by amendment, by a vote of 86 to 14.” “ Senate Passes Nuclear Energy Leadership Act In Defense Authorization Bill ” 2020. [43] Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: “The newly enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law created the Civil Nuclear Credit Program (CNC), allowing owners or operators of commercial U.S. reactors to apply for certification and competitively bid on credits to help support their continued operations.” [44] “More than half of all states include nuclear power in their plans to reduce carbon emissions from electricity generation, according to an Associated Press survey.” “ Nuclear power is gaining support after years of decline. But old hurdles remain ” 2022. [45] West Virginia: “West Virginia Gov. Jim Justice on Tuesday signed a bill eliminating the state's ban on nuclear power plants but cautioned against jumping in to diversify the coal-dependent state's energy offerings.” “ Coal-dependent West Virginia eliminates ban on nuclear power ” 2022. [46] Anonymized call notes, 2022-10-17. [47] “The learning curve relationship that we saw for the price of solar modules also holds for the price of electricity. The learning rate is actually even faster: At each doubling of installed solar capacity the price of solar electricity declined by 36% – compared to 20% for solar modules. Wind power – shown in blue – also follows a learning curve. The onshore wind industry achieved a learning rate of 23%. Every doubling of capacity was associated with a price decline of almost a quarter.” "Our World in Data - Why did renewables become so cheap so fast?" 2020. [48] From 2010 to 2019, the global weighted-average of the levelized cost of energy increased from $96 to $155 per MWh of electricity. Prices and construction times differed across countries. "Our World in Data - Why did renewables become so cheap so fast?" 2020. [49] We do not see the price difference between advanced nuclear reactors and renewables to be a major problem because we view nuclear as a complement to renewables instead of a substitute. [50] Table 1b. Estimated unweighted levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and levelized cost of storage (LCOS) for new resources entering service in 2027 (2021 dollars per megawatt hour). “ EIA - Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022 ” 2022. [51] Table 1b. Estimated unweighted levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and levelized cost of storage (LCOS) for new resources entering service in 2027 (2021 dollars per megawatt hour). “ EIA - Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022 ” 2022. [52] “An LCOE for an nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) SMR in the range of $51/MWh–$54/MWh was calculated for the NuScale design using NuScale’s design estimates. An LCOE in the range of $44–$51/MWh was calculated for the BWRX-300 using GE-Hitachi’s (GEH’s) design-to-cost and target pricing input.” “ Techno-economic Assessment for Generation III+ Small Modular Reactor Deployments in the Pacific Northwest ” 2021. [53] We have not closely compared advanced nuclear reactors to early-stage renewables that can provide uninterruptible electricity, such as advanced geothermal. [54] “Finally, IRA invests $700 million to support the development of a domestic supply chain for high-assay low-enriched uranium, commonly referred to as HALEU. This higher enriched fuel is urgently needed to support the deployment of advanced reactors, including DOE’s two demonstration projects with TerraPower and X-energy. Establishing a U.S. HALEU supply can also play a role in eliminating our current dependence on Russia for 20% of the enrichment and conversion services needed for our nuclear fuel supply.” “ Inflation Reduction Act Keeps Momentum Building for Nuclear Power ” 2022. [55] “Unnecessarily long licensing reviews can raise significant barriers to investment, reduce customer interest in advanced reactors, and threaten their successful long-term deployment.” “ Promoting Efficient NRC Advanced Reactor Licensing Reviews to Enable Rapid Decarbonization ” 2021. [56] “This bill revises the budget and fee structure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and requires the NRC to develop new processes for licensing nuclear reactors, including staged licensing of advanced nuclear reactors.” “ S.512 - Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act ” 2019. [57] “On November 2, 2020, the staff provided a response to SRM-SECY-20-0032 outlining a schedule for preparing a rulemaking package that conforms to the Commission’s direction to achieve publication of the final rule by October 2024 and to inform the Commission of key uncertainties impacting publication of the final rule by that date.” “ Part 53 – Risk Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors ” 2022. [58] “We show that the introduction of nuclear power can largely be explained by contextual variables such as the proximity of a country to a major technology supplier (‘ease of diffusion’), the size of the economy, electricity demand growth, and energy import dependence (‘market attractiveness’). The lack of nuclear newcomers in the early 1990s can be explained by the lack of countries with high growth in electricity demand and sufficient capacities to build their first nuclear power plant, either on their own or with international help.” Brutschin, Cherp, Jewell 2021 . [59] “Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act generally requires the conclusion of a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement for significant transfers of nuclear material or equipment from the United States.” “ 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation ” 2022. [60] We describe our confidence as low/medium/high to increase readability and avoid false precision. Since these terms can be interpreted differently, we use rough heuristics to define them as percentage likelihoods our takeaway (i.e., [not] plausibly within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider recommending) is correct. Low = 0-70%, medium = 70-90%, high = 90-100%. [61] Sierra Club: “The Sierra Club remains unequivocally opposed to nuclear energy.” “ Sierra Club - Nuclear Free Future ” n.d. Greenpeace: “Greenpeace got its start protesting nuclear weapons testing back in 1971. We’ve been fighting against nuclear weapons and nuclear power ever since.” “ Greenpeace - Nuclear Energy ” n.d. Friends of the Earth: “For 40 years, Friends of the Earth has been a leading voice in the U.S. opposing nuclear reactors.”” Friends of the Earth - Nuclear ” n.d. Climate Justice Alliance: “This flawed bill is deeply tainted by the inclusion of proposals that are not only unacceptable to the Environmental Justice (EJ) community, but dangerous to the climate and the planet. Of particular concern is the focus on and investment in nuclear energy, as well as the promotion of risky, unproven carbon removal schemes.” Climate Justice Alliance Deeply Disappointed With Passage of House Democrats Dirty Energy Bill " 2020. [62] “Nuclear energy, for example, results in 99.9% fewer deaths than brown coal; 99.8% fewer than coal; 99.7% fewer than oil; and 97.6% fewer than gas. Wind and solar are just as safe.” “ Our World in Data - Nuclear Energy ” 2022. [63] Once the uranium is enriched, it can be used effectively as nuclear fuel in power plants for three to five years, after which it is still radioactive and has to be disposed of….The operation of nuclear power plants produces waste with varying levels of radioactivity.” “ IAEA - What is Nuclear Energy? The Science of Nuclear Power ” 2022. [64] “While some advanced reactor coolants and moderators may have the advantages described above, some also have chemical properties that pose safety concerns. Examples include reactivity, toxicity, or corrosiveness of the primary coolant in the case of sodium, lead, and molten salts, respectively.” “ Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues ” 2019. [65] “The cooling water discharge from nuclear power plants (NPPs) is among the greatest local sources of thermal pollution due to the high levels of energy produced per plant. In addition, nuclear power plants require 30–100% more cooling water than other types of plant with a comparable power output.” Kirillin, Shatwell, and Kasprzak 2013 [66] Distribution of risk: “Advanced nuclear advocates often tout the benefits of nuclear projects to local communities: zero-emissions electricity with plenty of high-paying jobs and tax revenue. But our analysis finds an inequitable spread in the benefits and risks of historical nuclear power projects in the United States. The benefits from hosting a nuclear power plant tend to go to whiter and wealthier communities, whereas the riskier activities like uranium mining and milling have been concentrated in poorer communities, less educated communities and communities of color.” “ Host Communities and Nuclear Energy: Benefits for Some, Risks for Others ” 2022. Risks of uranium mining: “Despite evidence in Europe, from as early as 1932, that uranium mining posed occupational risks, health and safety protections for U.S. uranium miners were minimal until 1962, after U.S. Public Health Service studies concluded a correlation between radon levels in uranium mines and rates of cancer… Community contamination from legacy uranium mines exacerbates existing inequities in under-resourced communities that lack access to reliable income, food, and medical care.” “ State of Play: The Legacy of Uranium Mining on U.S. Tribal Lands ” 2022. [67] For this to be true, the likelihood of a nuclear meltdown per nuclear plant would have to decrease at a rate slower than an increase in nuclear power plants. We haven’t investigated this, but think this is a plausible scenario. [68] “Advanced nuclear reactors tend to incorporate passive and inherent safety systems as opposed to active systems. Passive systems refer primarily to two types of safety features: (1) the ability of these reactors to self-regulate the rate at which fission occurs through negative feedback mechanisms that naturally reduce power output when certain system parameters (such as temperature) are exceeded, and (2) the ability to provide sufficient cooling of the core in the event of a loss of electricity or other active safety systems… The chemical properties of various advanced coolants, fuels, and moderators may also contribute inherent safety advantages. Examples include higher boiling points for coolants, higher heat capacities for fuels and moderators, and higher retention of radioactive fission products for some coolants.” “ Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues ” 2019. [69] “For existing nuclear power plants in the United States, security and proliferation risks are generally considered to be low, given the current fuel cycle and safeguards regimes in place.” “ Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues ” 2019. [70] “Nuclear proliferation is not a risk in the United States simply because it already possesses nuclear weapons and is designated as a nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” “ “Advanced” Isn’t Always Better Assessing the Safety, Security, and Environmental Impacts of Non-Light-Water Nuclear Reactors ” 2021. [71] “The variety of advanced nuclear power plant designs have the potential to further reduce this relatively low risk, or to increase the risks, depending on the technical and policy choices and how they are implemented.” “ Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues ” 2019. [72] “The effect of reactor advancements on the risk of proliferation is ambiguous. Some sources state that advanced reactors produce less waste than what could traditionally be used to make nuclear weapons. In addition, advanced reactors are often designed to make fuel and waste less accessible than in traditional reactors. However, advanced reactors also often produce concentrated plutonium waste that may pose a higher proliferation risk than traditional reactors. As proliferation risks are generally perceived to be low for traditional reactors, slight differences due to advancements may not pose significant benefits or drawbacks.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [73] “Generally, the greatest inhibitors are substantial costs associated with the development and construction of first-of-a-kind reactors. These costs are inflated by risk premiums - uncertainty due to lack of mature deployment makes first-of-a-kind generators financially risky investments. Although some projections suggest that capital costs will be lower for mature advanced reactors than for traditional ones, it is also possible that there will be substantial capital costs associated with long and complex initial construction phases, creating a significant hurdle for adoption. Finally, even once advanced reactors are built again, they may still be relatively expensive to operate.” “ Resources for the Future - Advanced Nuclear Reactors 101 ” 2021. [74] Solar and wind: The cost of solar photovoltaics decreased from $378 per MWh in 2010 to $68 per MWh in 2019. Offshore wind decreased from $162 to $115 per MWh over the same time period. “ Our World in Data - Why did renewables become so cheap so fast? ” 2020. Batteries: “Since 1991, prices have fallen by around 97%. Prices fall by an average of 19% for every doubling of capacity. Even more promising is that this rate of reduction does not yet appear to be slowing down.” “ Our World in Data - The price of batteries has declined by 97% in the last three decades ” 2021. [75] High-innovation countries: We defined high-innovation countries as ones that have high research research output, as measured by Nature Index. “ Country/territory research output table ” 2022. Global advanced nuclear projects: We used Third Way’s map of advanced nuclear projects to determine which countries are working on advanced nuclear technologies. “ 2022 Advanced Nuclear Map: Charting a Breakout Year ” 2022.
Blog Posts (47)
- The Giving Green Fund’s 2024 priorities
Table of contents Background Systems change and pulling multiple levers Giving Green’s prioritized impact areas Industrial decarbonization Decreasing livestock emissions Carbon removal Supporting the energy transition in LMICs Nuclear power Solar geoengineering governance and coordination How you can take effective climate action Endnotes Background When we launched the Giving Green Fund in 2022, we initially focused on recommending timely grants to our Top Nonprofit recommendations based on their specific funding needs. We’ve since expanded our approach to include growth and ecosystem grants to promising organizations, as outlined in our previous blog post . With huge thanks to an anonymous gift we received in early 2024 , we intend to recommend allocations totaling at least $10M USD by the end of this year. In this post, we outline the priorities we have set for the Giving Green Fund in 2024, to be clear about our decision-making process and indicate the types of levers we might recommend funding this year. We invite organizations working in our prioritized impact areas to connect with us and we invite feedback on our approach. Systems change and pulling multiple levers To match the immensity of climate change, we believe mitigation requires a holistic strategy and deep societal transformation. Therefore, we focus on systems change instead of incremental action, and a portfolio of options instead of a single agenda. By focusing on these, we believe our high-level strategy and evidence-based approach gives donors more “bang for their buck” in the fight against climate change. Our focus on systems change: We categorize systems change interventions as ones with high potential for scale but perhaps a more uncertain or longer path to impact. Major interventions include policy advocacy, technology development, and market shaping, which all overlap with one another. Together, these interventions have and will continue to influence the adoption rate of new, greener technologies over existing, highly-polluting ones. For example, these have been the levers that have helped solar photovoltaic and battery technologies rapidly drop in price.[1] Our portfolio approach: We support diverse impact areas because there is no single solution to climate change. Tackling climate change requires various tools to address different sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, the uncertainty of systems change makes multiple approaches necessary if we want to increase our chances of success. Giving Green’s prioritized impact areas As part of our research process , we evaluate impact areas on the basis of scale, feasibility, and funding need . Based on our 2024 assessments, we have prioritized finding promising new funding opportunities in the following impact areas: Industrial decarbonization Decreasing livestock emissions Carbon removal Supporting the energy transition in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) Nuclear power Solar geoengineering governance and coordination We note that this list of prioritized impact areas is preliminary and we may not support funding new opportunities in all these areas. Additionally, shipping and aviation and next-generation geothermal technologies are still priorities for us. However, we do not plan to recommend additional grants in those impact areas outside of our current top recommendations, due to capacity constraints and the recency of our previous work in these areas. We plan to re-evaluate these impact areas in 2025. Honing in on our prioritized impact areas, we are interested in considering grants that address the challenges and levers described below. Industrial decarbonization Challenge: Heavy industries like steel and cement are the literal building blocks of the global economy. Heavy industry accounts for around one-third of greenhouse gas emissions, but has received very little attention from government or philanthropy. What we’re interested in exploring: We are interested in organizations working to reduce emission in industrial sectors, and are open to a variety of potential mechanisms. We will prioritize actions working on systems change and will consider global impacts of any organizations. Example levers: Building adequate demand for low-carbon products. Developing a supportive regulatory framework. Transition assistance that facilitates a switch to low-carbon production. Decreasing livestock emissions Challenge: Livestock production is responsible for ~15% of global emissions – some livestock belch methane, require substantial (often deforested) grazing land, and contribute to general supply chain emissions.[2] What we’re interested in exploring: We are interested in organizations that work to reduce some demand for high-emitting livestock products. We are also interested in organizations addressing direct methane emissions from livestock (enteric methane), which we think has been relatively neglected. Example levers: Research, industry, and policy support for alternative proteins. Policy advocacy for pricing agricultural emissions, such as the development of an agricultural emissions trading scheme. Research and policy support for reducing enteric methane emissions. Carbon removal Challenge: To reach mid-century climate goals, it is estimated that we will need to remove 10 billion tons of CO2 per year by 2050 to account for residual emissions.[3] However, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is far from ready to meet this demand, and there remains a need for policy and regulatory structures to scale this work. What we’re interested in exploring: We believe it's important to ensure civil society engagement matches private interest and investment in CDR. Supporting nonprofits can be valuable, as they can focus on tasks that industry might neglect, such as developing standards and protocols, policy advocacy, and ecosystem building. Example levers include: High-level strategies for government and international policies. Local policies and projects to build grassroots support for CDR. Increased global engagement, especially in LMICs. Supporting the energy transition in LMICs Challenge: We have identified India and Indonesia as focus countries because they are currently among the world’s top ten emitters and emissions in these fossil-fuel-dependent countries are expected to rise under business-as-usual.[4] If market barriers to carbon-free electricity production remain in place, the power sector will likely remain a major source of emissions as the countries’ total generation climbs. Demand for space cooling is also expected to soar in both countries as outside temperatures increase.[5] Inefficient air conditioners impact emissions and can strain the power grid, while lack of access to cooling adversely affects human health and wellbeing. What we’re interested in exploring: Our team is broadly interested in supporting organizations that can help enable a clean energy transition, such as through increasing renewables or improving energy efficiency, while ensuring energy access. Example levers: Developing energy transition plans and advocating for supportive and additive climate policies. Supporting private sector investment in zero-carbon technologies. Support for clean cooling, such as supporting building designs that reduce the need for mechanical cooling and making highly-efficient air conditioners that are already on the market more affordable. Nuclear power Challenge: We think nuclear power can play an important part in decarbonization because it provides consistent, carbon-free energy with a small land footprint. As part of a diverse energy portfolio, it can complement other energy sources, such as wind and solar. Our theory of change is that support for US-based nuclear innovation may help spread advanced nuclear reactors worldwide by reducing costs, providing a model for other countries, and enabling technology transfer. For this to happen, the US must show strong domestic demand and become a major exporter of these technologies. To achieve this, nuclear energy costs must be competitive with other low-carbon options, but currently, there is a stalemate between nuclear vendors and domestic buyers.[6] Additionally, vendors face numerous barriers in global markets.[7] What we’re interested in exploring: We are interested in efforts that could help derisk early projects and accelerate private sector commitment, especially for innovative designs. We are also broadly interested in efforts that could help boost domestic demand for nuclear power to help build a case for nuclear globally. Example levers: Policy advocacy for efforts that would help derisk early projects (e.g., building an orderbook by aggregating demand, cost overrun insurance, financial assistance). Community engagement to ensure and maintain a social license to operate. Solar geoengineering governance and coordination Challenge: Solar geoengineering aims to manage warming by either reflecting more sunlight away from the Earth or reducing the trapping of outgoing thermal radiation. Because research and interest in solar geoengineering are increasing, we believe there is a strong need for governance and coordination that minimizes its risks and prioritizes climate-vulnerable countries in discussion.[8] What we’re interested in exploring: We are interested in organizations conducting research that is deeply engaged with wider questions around the societal and environmental impacts of solar geoengineering. Additionally, given the environmental justice concerns surrounding decision-making processes for solar geoengineering, we’re also interested in organizations that work on international coordination. Example levers: Establishing regulations and standards of good practice to ensure high-quality research that avoids harm to humans and the environment. Capacity-building to involve climate-vulnerable countries in solar geoengineering governance. Additional thoughts: We think progress on solar geoengineering, even when it comes from well-meaning organizations, could pose a moral hazard by undermining progress on climate change mitigation. Given our uncertainties and concerns around solar geoengineering, we think we should only fund solar geoengineering governance and coordination if we think there is strong evidence to suggest that funding solar geoengineering governance is likely to increase the safety of solar geoengineering research and reduce the risk of moral hazard. How you can take effective climate action If you’re interested in helping us implement our strategy, here are a couple of ways you can take climate action, effectively: Donate to climate nonprofits : You can donate to the Giving Green Fund , which regrants to highly effective giving opportunities identified by our team, with no management fees. Alternatively, you can donate directly to any of our top nonprofits. Support Giving Green’s research: Each year, the Giving Green team spends thousands of hours to find and fund effective climate charities. We do not take any cut of donations to our recommendations, so we rely on generous donors to fund our research and communications efforts. Historically, every dollar donated to Giving Green’s operations has been converted into $11 of additional donations to high-impact climate charities. Support our work to be a climate impact multiplier. Questions? Want to collaborate? Regardless of where you are along your climate journey, we would love to hear from you. Contact us here . Endnotes 1. Gavlak et al (2018) “Evaluating the causes of cost reduction in photovoltaic modules” 2. “In short, livestock production appears to contribute about 11%–17% of global greenhouse gas emissions, when using the most recent GWP-100 values, though there remains great uncertainty in much of the underlying data such as methane emissions from enteric fermentation, CO2 emissions from grazing land, or land-use change caused by animal agriculture.” https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food-agriculture-environment/livestock-dont-contribute-14-5-of-global-greenhouse-gas-emissions 3. “Recent analyses of economically optimal solutions to the climate problem have concluded that NETs will play as significant a role as any mitigation technology, with perhaps 10 Gt/y CO2 of negative emissions needed approximately at midcentury and 20 Gt/y CO2 by the century’s end.” 4. Current emissions: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-share-of-co2-emissions?tab=table . 5. “By 2050, around 2/3 of the world’s households could have an air conditioner. China, India and Indonesia will together account for half of the total number.” https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-cooling 6. “However, the nuclear industry today is at a commercial stalemate between potential customers and investments in the nuclear industrial base needed for deployment—putting decarbonization goals at risk. Utilities and other potential customers recognize the need for nuclear power, but perceived risks of uncontrolled cost overrun and project abandonment have limited committed orders for new reactors.” https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/20230320-Liftoff-Advanced-Nuclear-vPUB.pdf 7. “However, a number of potential barriers exist for U.S. vendors in global markets, such as a complicated set of rules to market and sell nuclear products internationally, increased competition among nations, and potential expansion of nuclear reactors into newcomer countries that may lack effective government, industry, and societal frameworks to support the facilities. These potential barriers (some of which U.S. vendors have little control over) include development of regulatory oversight capabilities, financing mechanisms that provide market advantages to non-U.S. vendors, management of the fuel cycle, expanded transportation networks for nuclear materials, and education and outreach to local communities that may house reactors.” National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2023. Laying the Foundation for New and Advanced Nuclear Reactors in the United States. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26630 . 8. Increase in research and interest: “Historically, the topic of SG has been deeply controversial in the climate change community, with extreme hesitancy and taboo surrounding both scientific and governance engagement in the field. While there is still reticence, major institutions and organizations with strong influence are showing signs of a major shift in perception, activity, and interest over the last two to three years. Research efforts are starting to expand, there has been a significant increase in focus on SG governance—both domestically and globally, and press coverage is mounting.” https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/KCEP-Digest-59-Solar-Geoengineering.pdf
- Evolving the Giving Green Fund: Expanding our climate impact
In November 2022, we launched the Giving Green Fund (GGF) which has since granted $1.8 million USD to support the work of our top climate nonprofits . From its conception, we envisioned expanding the scope of our grants beyond our top nonprofits, since we believed that a fund model would open up additional high-impact donation options. A recent anonymous donation of $10 million has presented us with this opportunity. In particular, it has prompted us to evaluate if and how our strategy should evolve to maximize impact given this new magnitude of funding, specifically if this means supporting work not housed in our top nonprofits when we believe it to be equally or more catalytic. Contributing to our top recommendations will remain the fund's core function, and we will continue to recommend the majority of funds to these organizations. However, we will also begin exploring ways to expand the types of opportunities we support through specialty growth grants or ecosystem grants . How would this be distinct from our top recommendations? Each November, Giving Green releases a list of highly effective climate nonprofits and encourages donations to them. Our primary metric for selecting top nonprofits is that we think they are incredibly effective in reducing emissions per dollar spent. However, due to the nature of public recommendations, there are some additional constraints on the type of organizations we can support. A few additional requirements for our top nonprofits are: They have a strong and public track record such that we can transparently make the case for effectiveness. They have the ability to absorb at least $1 million productively, since our recommendations historically have received large donations due to our influence. We believe that unrestricted donations will go towards work that we believe is highly impactful, since it is difficult for many readers of Giving Green to make restricted donations. To decrease decision fatigue among our readers, we aim to have a small number (<10) of top nonprofits every year. Therefore, top nonprofits are suited to situations where there are 1-2 organizations within a philanthropic strategy that we think are especially deserving of support compared to others working on similar problems. During our research process, we sometimes identify high-impact funding opportunities that do not meet the above criteria. Going forward, we will consider recommending them for growth grants or ecosystem grants from the Giving Green Fund. What types of opportunities would we consider for a growth grant? Young and promising organizations We may consider growth grants to emerging organizations – young organizations that are preparing to launch or have existed for such a short period of time that they have a limited track record and therefore would not qualify to be a top recommendation. This would most likely be organizations working on a topic area that we have deemed to be high-priority, but where there are few or no organizations working in the space. In the case of a very new organization with inherently limited or no track record, we would closely assess the experience and qualification of leadership and the proposed theory of change. Similarly, growth grants would be appropriate for newer or small organizations that we think can only productively absorb a limited amount of funding, at least in the short run. We think this signals an opportunity to maximize the impact of the marginal dollar, especially in the case where Giving Green is an organization’s first institutional funder, and these organizations might not be in the position to productively absorb the magnitude of funding directed toward our top recommendations.[1] Supporting promising new organizations can strengthen civil society engagement by increasing the number and diversity of members in the ecosystem and filling critical gaps that may currently exist. Existing, highly effective organizations open to expansion in specific areas We would also consider established organizations, with strong track records, theories of change, networks, and influence, that are open to restricted grants directed at creating or expanding a specified work stream or launching a new project within a specific impact area. We think this can strengthen the ecosystem of nonprofits by expanding the capacity of effective, established nonprofits. We think the risk of our grant causing funding to be redirected to other areas can be minimized if these grants support new work streams or projects that did not exist before and for which funding would be additional. Funding specific research projects, analyses, and convenings We may also consider recommending funding to entities such as academic groups to perform technical analysis, develop public goods, or serve as conveners for key stakeholders. For example, we think there are political contexts in which traditional nonprofits are not well-positioned to influence policy and for which the route to influence policymakers may be through generating evidence-based reports or field building to influence the policy landscape over a longer period of time. We also envision instances in which more basic research is needed to bolster or inform nonprofit advocacy work. What types of opportunities would we consider for ecosystem grants? Giving Green’s research process involves first identifying high-impact philanthropic strategies, and then identifying top organizations working on these strategies. When selecting top nonprofits, we have tried to find the strongest 1-2 organizations working on a particular strategy. However, we may encounter cases where we are excited about a philanthropic approach, but there are a number of key organizations working on this approach that we feel are highly cost-effective. In this case, rather than have our list of top nonprofits dominated by a specific type of organization, we may instead decide to recommend a number of smaller grants that support the ecosystem as a whole. Mechanics of growth and ecosystem grants Growth and ecosystem grants considered outside of our top nonprofits would be single disbursements with no expectation for renewal. Growth and ecosystem grants will not be accompanied by the usual in-depth material that Giving Green publishes for priority impact areas and top nonprofits. Instead, these grants will be supported through deep dives on the relevant philanthropic strategy, and shorter write-ups of the activities of grantees. In addition, we plan to allocate these grants on a rolling basis as opportunities arise instead of adhering to the cycle of our top nonprofits, which are released annually in November. Is this framework subject to change? We think that expanding the types of opportunities we consider enables the fund to be more dynamic, responsive, and catalytic, reflecting the rhythm of policy, technology, and social change. We plan to continually assess the impact of our recommended disbursements, and we expect to iterate on the functions and frameworks of our fund to reflect our learnings. As always, we will continue to prioritize transparency and share the evolution of our products and processes with you. Grant areas of focus We intend to recommend grants of at least $10 million from the Giving Green Fund during the rest of 2024; we intend for these recommendations to be a mix of grants to our top nonprofits and growth and ecosystem grants. In a companion post, we describe our research priorities for 2024, which will inform recommended grants. Endnotes [1] “ In 2023, Giving Green influenced an estimated $11.2 million towards our recommendations.” https://www.givinggreen.earth/post/2023-annual-report#viewer-yga1y142
- Giving Green’s climate regranting fund receives $10 million anonymous donation
As the Giving Green Fund reaches new heights, we will level up disbursement strategies to support more high-leverage climate initiatives. In April, the Giving Green Fund, our regranting fund, received an unprecedented and unexpected gift of $10 million from an anonymous donor. Our small team was floored and delighted. The above screenshot captured our reactions when we found out during a routine team meeting. We do not know the donor behind this generous gift, and we respect their wish to remain anonymous. We are now shifting our focus to level up the disbursement strategies to support more high-leverage and underfunded work by effective climate charities. The Giving Green Fund is our highest-impact donation option. It was launched at the end of 2022 to help donors increase the responsiveness of their climate donations by using dynamic disbursement strategies, which we believe could have outsized impact. The potential for these strategies grows as the fund grows. The latest gift, which comes at the heels of another transformative $1 million donation from the Ray and Tye Noorda Foundation, calls for a new level of creativity. The majority of the $10 million will be regranted to Giving Green's top climate charity recommendations. We will analyze each organization's current funding situation and plans to use additional funds, and use this information to determine an allocation that we think will be most impactful. We also plan to use this grant to support high-impact initiatives that we think are exceptionally high impact but do not qualify to be top charities. We will give more detail on our plans for these “growth grants” in an upcoming post. For instance, we will consider: Seeding new charities. Supporting young and promising organizations. Funding specific research projects, analyses, and convenings. As with all contributions to the Giving Green Fund, we intend to disburse this money quickly so that it can get into the hands of the organizations doing the real work on the ground. We plan to make major disbursements in Q3 of 2024 and intend to regrant all of this gift by the end of the year. We started Giving Green because we were frustrated by the lack of climate action while overwhelmed by the plethora of suggested personal actions, not all of which truly move the needle. We have always known that there are more people like us: those who want to support climate initiatives but need some guidance on giving with confidence. Four years later, we have had the privilege to cross paths with some of them: from youth who raised $20 at yard sales to employees who donate through workplace giving schemes to anonymous donors with no strings attached. Thank you all for letting us be a part of your climate journey.