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Food System Emissions: Other Grantees // BACK Outside of our Top Nonprofits, the Giving Green Fund has awarded or plans to award grants to the following organizations in support of their work to reduce food system emissions: Future Matters Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) Spark Climate Solutions To understand how we identify high-leverage opportunities for philanthropists to reduce food system emissions, such as the above, please see Giving Green's deep dive on food system emissions .

Energy Transition in LMICs: Grantees // BACK Outside of our Top Nonprofits, the Giving Green Fund has awarded or plans to award grants to the following organizations advancing the energy transition in low- and middle-income countries: Prayas and IIT Delhi The Center for Study of Science, Technology, and Policy (CSTEP) Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development (IGSD) Vasudha Foundation Energy for Growth Hub To understand how we identify high-leverage opportunities for philanthropists to support the clean energy transition in low- and middle-income countries, please see Giving Green's deep dive on the energy transition in low- and middle-income countries .

Industrious Labs: Deep Dive // BACK Download the report: Industrious Labs 2024 .pdf Download PDF • 1.48MB This report was updated in November 2024. The original version of this report was published in November 2022. Unless otherwise cited, information in this deep dive comes from direct correspondence with Industrious Labs. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) provided for educational purposes. Support for Industrious Labs’ charitable climate advocacy runs through a Single Entity Fund of Tides Foundation, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. Summary What is Industrious Labs? Industrious Labs is an environmental organization launched in 2022 that aims to build advocacy networks to decarbonize heavy and light industry. What does Industrious Labs do? Industrious Labs is the only US-based organization singularly focused on industrial decarbonization advocacy. It works with partners from across the field (community, advocacy, politics, industry, etc.) to identify the unique narratives and levers that will move individual industrial sectors towards full decarbonization. Industrious Labs’ strategy has four pillars: (1) campaigns, (2) data and analytics, (3) field building, and (4) strategic communications, all of which work in collaboration to build evidence-based, sustainable advocacy efforts to decarbonize heavy and light industry. How could Industrious Labs help address climate change? Industrious Labs expects its activities to cause more heavy industry producers to switch to low-carbon production more quickly than they otherwise would have, resulting in earlier reductions in industrial emissions. It also focuses on activating the field of individuals and communities living on the frontlines of heavy industry to participate in creating a greener, sustainable future. What’s new at Industrious Labs in 2024? Industrious Labs has continued to grow its North-America-focused campaigns targeting landfill emissions, steel, and aluminum. It has also recently launched a global cement campaign and a state-based industrial heat campaign. What is Industrious Labs’ cost-effectiveness? In 2022, we developed a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to estimate the costs and impacts of Industrious Labs’ aluminum campaign to secure corporate commitments to switch to low-carbon procurement and production. This CEA included highly subjective guess parameters and was intended as a rough plausibility check. Overall, we estimate that Industrious Labs is highly cost-effective. We have low confidence in this CEA but generally view it as a positive input to our overall assessment of Industrious Labs. We did not update this CEA in 2024. Is there room for more funding? We think Industrious Labs can productively absorb additional funding, which could increase its growth trajectory over the next few years. In the longer term, we think Industrious Labs is likely to have strong fundraising success, which may limit its future room for more funding. Are there major co-benefits or potential risks? We think the co-benefits and potential risks of Industrious Labs’ efforts are similar to those for the broader effort to decarbonize heavy industry : it may reduce local pollution and have unclear employment effects as global industries respond to decarbonization. Key uncertainties and open questions: In addition to our broader uncertainties around decarbonizing heavy industry (e.g., geographic focus), we are uncertain about Industrious Labs’ industry-specific effectiveness, US focus, techno-feasibility assessments, and future room for more funding. Bottom line / next steps: We classify Industrious Labs as one of our top recommendations to address climate change, and we believe donations to Industrious Labs could increase its organizational growth trajectory. We plan to continue to assess our key uncertainties and believe that we will be able to substantially improve our understanding of these uncertainties as Industrious Labs continues executing its strategies in 2025.

State Legislative Advocacy // BACK This report was last updated in November 2020. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. What role can state-level or regional policy change in the US play in addressing climate change, especially in the absence of national climate policy? What factors determine which approaches to state-level policy change are most promising? In this document, we share our team's thinking on state-level policy change, our next focus for recommendations. We also present the findings from our initial round of research on a short-list of climate activism organizations we identified through our own search and consultation with climate policy experts. We overview each organization's operations and accomplishments to date along with their organizational structure and finances, and we provide our reasoning on why we did or did not select each organization for further research in 2020. State_Legislative_Advocacy .pdf Download PDF Note: This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Vasudha Foundation // BACK Overview The Giving Green Fund plans to award a grant to the Vasudha Foundation to enhance its internal expertise, support its ongoing work on green hydrogen in industrial decarbonization, and explore technologies in energy efficiency and demand-side management. Vasudha Foundation, based in Delhi, India, adopts a data-driven approach to advancing a clean energy transition in India alongside promoting clean, sustainable, affordable, and 24x7 energy for all. This falls within our philanthropic strategy of an energy transition in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) . Please see Giving Green’s deep dive report for more information, including risks and potential co-benefits, sub-strategies, theory of change, funding need, and key uncertainties. Last updated: October 2024 What is the Vasudha Foundation? Vasudha Foundation, established in 2010, conducts research and creates data repositories to promote evidence-based and inclusive decision-making around climate policy in India. Vasudha Foundation works closely with central government bodies, such as NITI Aayog, the government think tank, and state-level governments, including departments in Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Orissa. Vasudha Foundation focuses on renewable and clean energy sectors, electromobility, and climate action. Its flagship projects center around designing and implementing climate action plans on state and district levels, in addition to generating dashboards and analytics on greenhouse gas emissions and climate finance for policymakers. What are we funding, and how could it help reduce greenhouse gas emissions? We are funding Vasudha’s core operations, with a particular focus on in-house capacity building, green hydrogen work in industrial decarbonization, and exploring energy-efficient technologies. We believe that unrestricted funding will allow Vasudha to accommodate impromptu requests from state governments and expand its outreach to states that have shown an interest in collaborating on net-zero trajectories. In-house capacity building: Vasudha Foundation will enhance its internal expertise to deliver high-quality, state-specific support in designing and implementing net-zero pathways. Capacity building will equip the Vasudha Foundation team with the latest knowledge about energy transition technologies and strategies and develop AI-based tools for data analysis, modeling, and monitoring. Green hydrogen for industrial decarbonization: Vasudha Foundation will continue its ongoing assessment of the role of green hydrogen in decarbonizing heavy industry. Vasudha Foundation is evaluating the production, storage, and application of green hydrogen and will explore its integration in select states’ industrial ecosystems. Vasudha Foundation will also support state-level agencies in preparing bankable Detailed Project Reports to attract greater investment in green hydrogen. Energy Efficiency and Demand Side Management: Vasudha Foundation will identify key sectors for maximizing energy savings and promoting efficient technologies, as well as explore policy frameworks and communication strategies to encourage behavioral shifts toward energy conservation. We believe that unrestricted funding can equip the Vasudha Foundation with greater expertise and flexibility in producing and disseminating technical knowledge to state governments to achieve their net-zero targets. Why do we think the Vasudha Foundation will use this funding well? Vasudha Foundation is a leading think tank and crucial partner to state governments in advancing their energy transitions. Its technical work—for example, the Greenhouse Gas Platform India—has been applauded by the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change. Vasudha Foundation led the creation of a pan-India dashboard on the energy sector, climate, and related economic indicators for NITI Aayog. Vasudha Foundation was on the panel of experts advising the “energy transition” for the Government of Kerala. We believe Vasudha Foundation’s track record and policy wins demonstrate its central role in advancing India’s decarbonization agenda. For more on the difference between the grantees of the Giving Green Fund and our Top Nonprofits, please see this blog post on the Giving Green Fund. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Nuclear Power: Other Grantees // BACK Outside of our Top Nonprofits, the Giving Green Fund has awarded or plans to award grants to the following organizations in support of their work on advanced nuclear power: Energy for Growth Hub Good Energy Collective ClearPath Nuclear Innovation Alliance To understand how we identify high-leverage opportunities for philanthropists to support advanced nuclear power, such as the above, please see Giving Green's deep dive on nuclear power.

ClearPath // BACK Overview The Giving Green Fund plans to award a restricted grant to ClearPath , a US-based nonprofit accelerating US innovation to reduce global emissions. We have restricted our grant to ClearPath’s work on either nuclear power or decarbonizing heavy industry. Nuclear power: We are supporting an ecosystem of nonprofits working on policies supporting advanced nuclear innovation in the US given that the US is important for designing and demonstrating these technologies before they are exported elsewhere. Heavy industry: This is one of a series of grants to support an ecosystem of nonprofits working to expand and decarbonize domestic industrial production through increased public and private investment, along with trade policy that favors cleaner industrial material imports. While most of ClearPath’s work is focused on US stakeholders, we think that since these efforts include trade policy, they can have a global impact. ClearPath falls within our impact areas of nuclear power and decarbonizing heavy industry. Please see Giving Green’s deep dive reports on nuclear power and heavy industry for more information about the general impact area, including risks and potential co-benefits, philanthropic strategies, theory of change, funding need, and key uncertainties. Last updated: October 2024 What is ClearPath? ClearPath is a US-based nonprofit founded in 2014 to support global emissions reductions through US innovation. It focuses on right-of-center policies for decarbonization. Its focus areas include clean energy, carbon removal, clean manufacturing, and setting the US as a global leader in deploying clean energy technologies. We have looked specifically into its work on nuclear power and clean manufacturing. What are we funding at ClearPath, and how could it help reduce emissions? Nuclear power Nuclear power can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by replacing or avoiding carbon-emitting energy sources. It can work alongside renewable energy by providing a steady electricity supply, regardless of the season or environmental conditions. The future of advanced nuclear reactors, which are designed to be lower cost to build than traditional nuclear reactors and have advanced safety features, depends on technological progress and political conditions. ClearPath is promoting investment in nuclear projects by developing policies that reduce project financing risks and promote investment. It is also educating policymakers on the importance of support from U.S. financing institutions like the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. These efforts aim to remove key obstacles to building new nuclear projects both inside and outside the US, speeding up deployment overall. Industry Leading the Clean Industrial Technology Campaign (CITC): ClearPath runs a bipartisan coalition, CITC, focused on decarbonizing cement and steel production. Through educating policymakers and drafting legislation, the coalition highlights critical opportunities where US innovation meets industrial decarbonization. The coalition includes representatives from environmental groups, labor groups, and the private sector. Expanding its work to include chemicals and refining: ClearPath has focused its industry work on concrete/cement and iron/steel, however, it would like to expand its work to include chemicals and refining. In keeping with its focus on innovation, ClearPath, in coordination with key stakeholders, would like to identify and develop policies that would unlock public and private investment for research and development to decarbonize chemicals and refining. Why do we think ClearPath will use this funding well? ClearPath’s strong track record and its focus on US innovation enable it to build bipartisan support and reach a broad set of stakeholders. We think this is especially important for industrial decarbonization as it will largely be driven by the coordination of strategic policies and private-sector engagement. We are also excited to support its expansion into chemicals and refining, an area of heavy industry that has received relatively less philanthropic engagement. We're also excited about ClearPath's work on nuclear power because it has become a trusted and collaborative leader in crafting practical policies that tackle key obstacles. For more on the difference between the grantees of the Giving Green Fund and our Top Nonprofits, please see this blog post on the Giving Green Fund. ClearPath has 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) entities. As Giving Green is part of IDinsight, which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of ClearPath’s 501(c)(3) arm, and not on ClearPath’s 501(c)(4) entity. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

Farmers for Climate Action: Recommendation // BACK This report was last updated in December 2021. It may no longer be accurate, both with respect to the evidence it presents and our assessment of the evidence. We may revise this report in the future, depending on our research capacity and research priorities. Questions and comments are welcome. Giving Green believes that donating to our top recommendations is likely to be the most impactful giving strategy for supporting climate action. However, we recognize that donors have different preferences regarding where they give - for instance, due to tax deductibility in their home country. Taking this into consideration, we recommend Farmers for Climate Action specifically for audiences with specific giving criteria that direct them to Australian nonprofits. We believe Farmers for Climate Action to be a high-impact option, but we are unsure of the extent to which its cost-effectiveness approaches that of our top recommendations. Summary Farmers for Climate Action (FCA) is a movement of farmers, agricultural leaders and rural Australians working to ensure they are part of the solution to climate change. It is the only farmer-led organisation focused specifically on adapting to and mitigating climate change in the Australian agricultural sector[1]. FCA is a registered charity[2], and now represents more than 6,500 farmers and has over 45,000 total supporters[3]. Its work includes farmer education and training, industry and government advocacy, research and partnerships, and building farmer networks and communities of practice. FCA’s theory of change is grounded in the belief that if it organises farmers, graziers and agriculturalists to lead climate solutions on-farm and advocate together, it can influence the sector and the government to adopt climate policies that reduce emissions and benefit regional and rural communities. Given the Nationals are one of the most significant barriers to climate action in Australia, FCA’s influence in key Nationals-held constituencies will help achieve the policies needed for Australia to reduce emissions at the scale and speed necessary to avoid catastrophic temperature rise. This diagram outlines FCA’s theory of change: Despite being a relatively new organisation, FCA has proven to have significant influence on climate policies at the state and federal level. FCA’s advocacy saw Nationals MP Anne Webster announce that she would not uphold the Nationals’ line on coal[4]. FCA has garnered significant support from the Victorian Nationals, which has also started calling for stronger climate action. At the industry level, the experts we interviewed indicated FCA was instrumental in the National Farmers Federation’s (NFF) decision to support an economy-wide net zero by 2050 target. This is significant given the relationship between the NFF and the Nationals Party. FCA also conducts education and training programs to help farmers implement climate smart practices that reduce agriculture and land use emissions. This training, along with media training and broader community engagement initiatives, has helped position farmers as an evidence-based voice to engage on climate change at local, state and federal levels. For more information on FCA, please review our Deep Dive Report on the organisation. Based on FCA’s achievements, strategic approach to addressing climate policy barriers, and the impact that additional funding would have, we recommend it as one of our top organisations for influencing climate policy in Australia. Donate to Farmers for Climate Action. Why we recommend Farmers for Climate Action The Giving Green Australia: 2021 Research Process details how we identified the highest impact organisations working to improve climate policy in Australia. The process involved expert interviews, an expert survey, focus groups, and desk research. We focused on organisations that are using the three key approaches our research determined are the highest priority for delivering policy change: ‘insider advocacy’, ‘outsider advocacy’ and ‘changing the story’. FCA uses all three of these priority approaches. Furthermore, FCA was nominated 11 times by the 52 experts we surveyed, which was the second highest number of votes any organisation received. FCA would also deliver substantial returns from additional marginal investment. In our assessment of FCA’s impact, we spoke with representatives from FCA and interviewed a number of climate policy and advocacy experts and practitioners. We also reviewed publicly available information on FCA, including its website and policy reports, as well as media coverage of the organisation. Our research led us to conclude that FCA is one of the most effective organisations working to improve Australia’s climate policy. Additional funding is likely to have a high marginal impact on reducing greenhouse gas emissions through influencing policy change and farmer practices. Here, we present our reasons for recommending FCA. We also recommend that those interested read our Deep Dive Report on FCA. 1.FCA’s board, staff and members have strong connections with the Nationals Party, industry leaders and regional communities most affected by climate change. As one of the largest farmer-led organisations, FCA is well placed to advocate for the industry and rural and regional farming communities that are most impacted. Its board directors are industry leaders, with more than 200 years of combined experience in agriculture. FCA’s staff have expertise in politics, advocacy, regional development, media and marketing, and they are supported by Australia’s leading climate and agriculture researchers. FCA has over 45,000 supporters (i.e. people that attend local events, promote campaigns or are engaged as volunteers, but not necessarily farmers), of which 6,500 are members (i.e. those that have identified as farmers). It expects to grow to 8,000 members in the next financial year, however is aiming for 10,000. FCA’s members are from across the industry, including from the beef and sheep, horticulture, cropping and dairy sectors[5]. FCA’s members span the whole country, enabling them to focus on both local and national climate policies. The Nationals are one of the most significant blockers to climate action at the federal level, which is why FCA is working to mobilise the constituents that Nationals politicians claim to represent. Historically, the Nationals claim to represent rural and regional farming communities, however its opposition to agriculture emissions reduction policies is increasingly at odds with what farmers want for the sector. FCA is building the collective voice of farmers, industry groups, communities and politicians to challenge Nationals’ positions on climate change at the federal level. By offering training on media engagement and advocacy, farmers are well positioned to engage with the media and the government, and can run campaigns on industry- and community-specific climate issues and policies. In 2021, FCA launched a roadshow in the electorate of Mallee and engaged over 60 farmers through events culminating in a forum where the local Nationals member, Anne Webster, announced she would not uphold the Nationals line on coal[6]. 2. FCA’s research and advocacy is helping to reframe the narrative about agriculture and climate change at the industry and government level. FCA has played a significant role in shifting the public discourse that suggests that strong climate policy is bad for the agricultural sector. Following the Government’s announcement that it would not sign up to the Global Methane Pledge launched at COP26 in November 2021, FCA was one of the main industry bodies challenging the Nationals’ suggestion that this decision was to protect the agriculture sector[7]. FCA works through a range of research and education partnerships that help shift the narrative around agriculture and climate change. Most recently, FCA commissioned Ernst and Young to produce the report How can Australia’s agriculture sector realise opportunity in a low emissions future [8]. The report outlines how the sector can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and capitalise on the clean energy transition. The report was launched with NFF president, Fiona Simson and Victorian Nationals leader Peter Walsh. Coordinator for Australia’s climate strategy for COP26, James Larsen, attended the launch and later sought advice from FCA on the Federal Government’s commitment in the lead up to COP. The report also led to almost 700 media clips. FCA and its members are increasingly sought after spokespeople on climate change in both mainstream and conversative media outlets. In the last 12 months, over 130 farmers received media training, regularly engaging with the media and sharing their experiences on the frontline of climate change impacts. This resulted in over 400 media items (not including syndication) featuring FCA or their farmers. 3. FCA’s education and training on climate smart agriculture is influencing action by farmers. FCA provides educational resources that support farmers to reduce emissions, ranging from practices that help with methane reduction to better land and waste management. The education and training initiatives include conferences, forums and workshops that showcase the latest in climate change and agricultural science[9], annual fellowships in local communities, and publications and toolkits on climate-smart agriculture. It recently released the ‘climate smart agriculture tool kit’[10], which offers tips and strategies for implementing different solutions. Over 1,000 farmers reported having greater knowledge of what they can do to reduce emissions on their farms as a result of FCA’s work, with 86.7 per cent of participating farmers reporting they have gained knowledge and skills. 4. Federal and state governments on both sides of politics are already implementing FCA’s policy recommendations. Many of FCA’s policy advocacy efforts have been successful to date. In 2019, FCA’s advocacy generated bipartisan support for establishing the National Climate Change and Agriculture Work Program for state and federal agriculture ministers[11]. The work program focuses on four key priorities: the development and delivery of information and tools to improve on-farm decisions and risk management; research and innovation to support adaptation and mitigation technology; strengthening market opportunities for farming businesses; and increasing biosecurity[12]. The newly formed Climate Change Task Group was established to oversee the work program and report to the Agricultural Senior Officials Committee. One expert noted that FCA played an integral role in recently approved changes to the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF)[13]. The ERF is a voluntary scheme that provides incentives for the adoption of new practices and technologies to reduce emissions[14]. The changes introduced ultimately enhance farmers' access to the scheme. Changes included the addition of ‘method stacking’, which would allow farmers to implement multiple ERF projects on the one property using multiple methods[15]. In practice, this means that farmers can claim credits for implementing multiple sequestration methods (such as land regeneration) via the one application. Other policy wins include changes to the taxation of income generated through the sale of ACCUs (Australian Carbon Credit Units). Put simply, farmers are now taxed at a lower rate for income generated by offset projects, such as increasing soil carbon, reducing livestock emissions and reforestation[16]. The aim of this change is to incentivise further decarbonisation and offset initiatives. By facilitating further uptake of on-farm emissions reduction activities, farming communities are likely to be less resistant to increased national emissions reduction ambition. 5. Additional marginal investment could help FCA mobilise farmers as a key voter group to shift the Nationals’ climate policies. FCA’s operating budget for the 2021-2022 financial year is $1.7 million, and is projected to grow to $2 million for the 2022-2023 period. Over 80 per cent of FCA’s 2020-2021 funding came from donations and bequests, under three per cent from government grants, and six per cent from other revenues[17]. FCA is making a meaningful contribution to changing the narrative around climate action for key constituencies in rural and regional Australia. If successful, it could help shift the Nationals’ climate change policy and remove a major impediment to accelerating climate action at a federal level. Immediate funding in the short term would help FCA develop organising strategies for key electorates, and then establish member networks that would build local support for strong climate policy. This would include local campaigns and events to achieve politicians’ and candidates’ support for progressive climate policies at the local, state and federal level. It would also involve ongoing training of farmers to build their presence in local and rural media outlets to promote solutions and policy changes. Ongoing marginal funding would help hire full-time professional staff needed to strengthen FCA’s policy acumen and build up the reach of its call centre. The latter will be important in supporting direct engagement with farmers across the country. Risks to Farmers for Climate Action FCA is in a period of rapid growth. As noted by several experts, its ongoing impact will depend on its ability to expand the team in a way that caters to its growing membership, hones the targeted political and industry expertise required, and achieves ongoing financial sustainability. FCA has had a significant impact in its short history with a very small team, but it is this limited capacity that poses the greatest challenge in realising its full potential. Hiring decisions will be key as FCA’s work increasingly focuses on the policy space, with one expert noting the need for stronger policy experience on staff as key to mitigating this gap. While FCA’s funding has increased, it was noted that further funding would be needed to secure the type of expertise required to capitalise on growing media and public presence and influence. This is less of a risk, but will be an important consideration for the organisation going forward. As a comparatively young organisation, financial sustainability will be key to FCA having an ongoing impact. Recent internal fundraising efforts have been successful, however developing ongoing and diversified income streams to support sustainable growth will also be vital. Some may suggest that Australia cannot reach net zero emissions unless meat production is drastically reduced[18], such that FCA’s lack of a position on reducing herd sizes is inconsistent with effective action on climate change. Our view is that meat producers will continue to produce meat as long as consumers demand it (which 97 per cent of Australians still do)[19], and as long as it remains profitable. Neither a Liberal-National Coalition nor a Labor Government show any sign of considering the introduction of policies that would actively discourage meat consumption or make meat production more expensive. It is more realistic to expect an Australian Government to introduce policies that would incentivise alternative uses of farmland that help to reduce emissions (i.e. ‘carrots’ not ‘sticks’): which Australia’s Emissions Reduction Fund does. Moreover, there is high potential to reduce agriculture emissions using methane-reduction technologies that are in their infancy (such as feeding asparagopsis to cows)[20], and improved land-use methods (such as savannah burning)[21]. Research and development support in the short-term could help farmers commercialise these solutions. FCA is well-placed to advocate for policies to incentivise this. We are therefore confident that recommending FCA for additional funding will have positive climate outcomes, especially because of FCA’s influence in strategic Nationals-held electorates. Conclusion Given the Nationals are one of the most significant barriers to climate action in Australia, FCA’s influence in key Nationals-held constituencies will help achieve the policies needed for Australia to reduce emissions at the scale and speed necessary to avoid catastrophic temperature rise. Additional marginal investment would help FCA scale its advocacy efforts and policy influence, including hiring a policy expert and expanding the call-centre team to enhance their farmer outreach efforts. Based on our research, we believe that FCA will make a significant contribution to accelerating climate policy in Australia. Donate to FCA Endnotes [1] https://farmersforclimateaction.org.au/what-we-do/ [2] https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/bebceb7c0986369732f5048a9980e4e4#overview [3] https://farmersforclimateaction.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/FCA-Annual-Report-2020-2021_Fv3-1.pdf Note: supporters are members of the public that are engaged in campaigns, or attend events for example, but may not be farmers. Of that total, there are 6,500 that identify as farmers. [4] https://www.sunraysiadaily.com.au/farming/4222349/anne-webster-im-not-toeing-the-party-line-on-coal [5] Members self-select the industries they are engaged in. The current breakdown is: beef (27%), mixed (18%), regenerative (17%), horticulture (12%), cropping (11%), sheep/wool (8%), dairy and other (7%). [6] Giving Green - FCA Survey Response [7] https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/nov/04/farmers-split-on-australias-refusal-to-sign-up-to-global-methane-pledge-at-cop26 [8] https://farmersforclimateaction.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FCA-EY-FINAL-Report-Low-emissions-future-for-Agriculture.pdf [9] https://farmersforclimateaction.org.au/conferences_and_workshops/ [10] https://farmersforclimateaction.org.au/climate-smart-agriculture-toolkit/ [11] https://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/climatechange/national-approach-agriculture [12] https://djpr.vic.gov.au/about-us/news/national-climate-change-and-agriculture-plan-agreed [13] https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/taylor/media-releases/new-erf-method-and-2022-priorities-announced [14] http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/About-the-Emissions-Reduction-Fund [15] https://www.climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-09/29%20-%20ERF%20Review%20Submissions%20-%20Farmers%20for%20Climate%20Action.pdf [16] http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Choosing-a-project-type [17] https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/bebceb7c0986369732f5048a9980e4e4#overview [18] https://bze.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Land-Use-report-2014-compressed.pdf [19] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-26/vegans-comprise-just-1-per-cent-of-the-population-survey-finds/11635306 [20] https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0247820 [21] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263932348_Fire_in_Australian_Savannas_from_leaf_to_landscape ; see also https://nph.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nph.13130 ; https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26630453/ // BACK

Industrious Labs: Recommendation // BACK Industrious Labs: Recommendation Last updated in November 2024. Industrious Labs is one of the top climate nonprofits selected by Giving Green in 2024. We previously recommended Industrious Labs in 2023 and 2022 . Heavy industries like steel and cement are the building blocks of the global economy. They account for approximately one-third of greenhouse gas emissions but have not been a major focus of governments or philanthropists. Industrious Labs focuses on scaling industrial decarbonization advocacy by designing and implementing campaigns targeting corporate actors and governments to adopt policies to transform the sector. Critically, through coalition building, regranting, and training, it is scaling advocacy well beyond its own organization. Industrious Labs is a relatively new organization that has shown considerable progress in pushing forward multiple campaigns in just over two years. We also think Industrious Labs has substantial growth potential. It is building dedicated teams for each of its industry-specific campaigns, and there is considerable room to deepen existing campaigns and add new sectors. We are excited about its potential for impact because it is focused on a highly neglected area, its leadership has a track record of success, and comprehensive industry-specific strategies will pull on the right levers to drive heavy industry transition. For more information, see our deep dive on Industrious Labs , a summary below, and our broader report on decarbonizing heavy industry . What is Industrious Labs? Launched in 2022, Industrious Labs is a US-based environmental organization that aims to strategically coordinate other organizations to decarbonize heavy industry. How could Industrious Labs help address climate change? Industrious Labs expects its activities to prompt more heavy industry producers to switch to low-carbon production more quickly than they otherwise would have, resulting in reduced emissions sooner. What does Industrious Labs do? Industrious Labs’ strategy has four levers: (1) it runs campaigns for steel, aluminum, landfill emissions, industrial heat, and cement; (2) it provides open-source data and analysis; (3) it collaborates with communities and partner organizations; and (4) it increases media attention on the sector. These levers work in tandem to create an evidence base and momentum for systemic change in decarbonizing heavy industry. What’s new in 2024? In October 2024, Industrious Labs launched North America-focused campaigns targeting landfill emissions, steel, and aluminum. It has recently launched a cement campaign and a state-based industrial heat campaign. What would Industrious Labs do with your donation? Donations would help Industrious Labs build its campaigns, expand its work internationally, support its capacity-building and environmental justice efforts, and increase its capacity to conduct in-depth analyses. Why is Giving Green excited about Industrious Labs? Giving Green is excited about Industrious Labs’ focus on long-neglected industries, actionable industry-specific strategies, and the strength of its leadership team. In its early days, it has shown substantial convening power, evidenced by the strong networks it has built across campaigns. Explore ways to give to Industrious Labs and more. Support for Industrious Labs' charitable climate advocacy runs through a Single Entity Fund of Tides Foundation, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. This is a non-partisan analysis (study or research) and is provided for educational purposes.

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2022 updates to Giving Green's approach and recommendations // BACK This report was last updated in November 2022. Contents Summary What we’ve accomplished and learned Our theory of change Organizational theory of change Research prioritization Our research process Updates to our process and products Our 2022 recommendations Top recommendations Re-evaluation of previous US policy recommendations Re-recommendation: Clean Air Task Force Re-recommendation: Evergreen Collaborative No longer recommending: Carbon180 New top recommendations Food systems: The Good Food Institute Nuclear energy: Good Energy Collective Decarbonizing heavy industry: Industrious Labs Our recommendations for businesses Key uncertainties and plans to address them Our plans for 2023 Appendix Additional uncertainties Summary What we’ve accomplished and learned: Since our 2020 launch, we conducted broad reviews on 20 climate change approaches and published 10 giving recommendations. We estimate we’ve directed around $3.6M to these recommendations. We’ve made some mistakes along the way and have continually refined our research approach and model. Our theory of change: At a high level, Giving Green’s theory of change follows a five-step process. We produce high-quality recommendations, supporters make donations based on these recommendations, and recommended organizations increase their activities. These activities remove or avoid atmospheric GHG, which subsequently reduces human suffering due to climate change. We think there are two ways our research and recommendations can be especially impactful: (1) Direct funding to highly cost-effective giving opportunities and (2) in high-interest giving areas, reallocate funding from low-impact opportunities to higher-impact opportunities. We think directing funding to highly cost-effective giving opportunities is the most important research Giving Green can focus on, since it’s our impression that these organizations are able to do substantially more with each dollar than some of the most well-known philanthropic opportunities. Our research process: Over the past year, we estimate we spent around 6,000 hours searching for, identifying, evaluating, and publishing research on our recommendations. To identify our 2022 top recommendations, we conducted a broad assessment of the climate philanthropy landscape, identified promising strategies, developed a longlist of organizations working on each strategy, conducted “shallow dive” and subsequent “deep dive” research on a subset of these organizations, and published recommendations. For our recommendations targeted to businesses, we followed a similar process that included user research to ensure our recommendations would be applicable to business-specific criteria and preferences. Updates to our process and products: In addition to thinking about what we should research, we’re also continually making efforts to improve how we conduct and communicate our research. Our improvements focus on two guiding principles: increasing the quality and increasing the transparency of our research. Updates include: formalizing our theory of change and research prioritization; publishing mistakes we’ve made; increasing our reasoning transparency; increasing public-facing research; and expanding citations. We plan to focus more on this in the years to come. Our 2022 top recommendations: We think our top recommendations are the most important way we can have impact. Though there is inherent uncertainty in assessing and comparing the cost-effectiveness of many of these funding opportunities, we believe these recommendations represent organizations and initiatives that can be highly effective with additional philanthropic funding. They include a re-analysis of our previous recommendations, as well as new recommendations focused on food systems, nuclear energy, and decarbonizing heavy industry. Our 2022 top recommendations are Clean Air Task Force, Evergreen Collaborative, The Good Food Institute, Good Energy Collective, and Industrious Labs. Our recommendations for businesses: In order of priority, we recommend businesses (a) consider cost-effective opportunities to directly reduce their own emissions, (b) donate to our top recommendations, (c) donate to carbon removal funds, and (d) purchase high-quality carbon removal or offset credits. Our specific recommendations for businesses include making catalytic investments in carbon removal though the Frontier or Milkywire funds; buying carbon removal from Mash Makes, Charm Industrial, or Climeworks; or buying high-quality carbon offsets from Tradewater or BURN. Key uncertainties and plans to address them: We aim to be highly transparent about the uncertainties we have in our approach and research. Some of our key overall uncertainties include: whether there is a better way to define and target human suffering due to climate change; how we should think about climate impact today versus tomorrow; and within our top recommendations, identifying the most cost-effective giving opportunity. Our plans for 2023: We look forward to continuing to engage with the broader climate community to learn and share in the year ahead. As always, we will remain focused on our mission to reduce human suffering due to climate change. Though we will remain flexible and may revise plans, our current top priorities include: executing our plans to address key uncertainties, publishing an annual report, publishing additional information on earlier-stage climate landscape research, expanding research into new topics, and continuing to generally improve the quality and usefulness of our work. What we’ve accomplished and learned Since Giving Green officially launched in 2020, we’ve been busy. Over the past two years, we conducted broad reviews on 20 climate change approaches to educate ourselves and our readers, as well as provide direction for our recommendations research.[ 1 ] We published 10 giving recommendations, including overall top recommendations (at the time, US policy change), recommendations for donors restricted to Australia opportunities, and carbon offsets/removal recommendations for businesses with net-zero goals.[ 2 ] We estimate we’ve directed around $3.6M to these recommendations, with around 90% going to our top recommendations.[ 3 ] We also did some light research to provide high-level guidance to investors.[ 4 ] Over this time, we’ve continually refined our research approach and model (see Our theory of change ). We’ve also made some mistakes . We’ve grown from a two- to six-person team, benefited from collaboration and engagement with a broad suite of stakeholders in the climate change space, and know that there’s plenty more work to be done. Below, we’re pleased to share our latest thinking on our approach to reducing climate change, our 2022 recommendations, our key uncertainties, and our plans for 2023 and beyond. Our theory of change Organizational theory of change Giving Green’s mission is to direct donors to highly impactful opportunities to reduce human suffering due to climate change. However, we don’t have a formalized definition of what human suffering means in practice, since it’s hard to define and measure, and is generally open to interpretation. As a proxy, we use greenhouse gas (GHG) atmospheric levels as our outcome of interest. We think this is a useful proxy because it’s easily measurable and, we think, generally leads us to the same conclusions we would’ve made if we tried to directly focus on reducing human suffering due to climate change. However, we’re uncertain about this and plan to explore ways in which we might improve this proxy (see Key Uncertainties and plans to address them ). At a high level, Giving Green’s theory of change follows a five-step process. We produce high-quality recommendations, supporters make donations based on these recommendations, and recommended organizations increase their activities. These activities remove or avoid atmospheric GHG, which subsequently reduces human suffering due to climate change. See Figure 1 for a high-level illustration. Figure 1. Giving Green organizational theory of change Research prioritization So what does our theory of change imply for how we should prioritize our research, given limited research capacity? We think there are two ways our research and recommendations can be especially impactful: (1) Direct funding to highly cost-effective giving opportunities and (2) in high-interest giving areas, reallocate funding from low-impact opportunities to higher-impact opportunities. We think directing funding to highly cost-effective giving opportunities is the most important research Giving Green can focus on, since it’s our impression that these organizations are able to do substantially more with each dollar than some of the most well-known philanthropic opportunities. These are our “ top recommendations ,” summarized below. Since high-interest areas attract substantial attention and financing, we also think focusing on these areas can have a positive impact. Our current high-interest research includes: carbon removal opportunities for businesses, carbon offsets for businesses, and Australia-specific recommendations.[ 5 ] For both our top recommendations and high-interest areas, we think donors sometimes have restrictions or self-imposed preferences that cause them to give less (overall and/or to specific initiatives) than they would otherwise give. For example, a business with net-zero goals might donate $10,000 to our Frontier carbon removal recommendation , but would never donate to our US policy recommendations due to fears of being perceived by customers as political or partisan. An Australia-based donor may be more likely to give to Australian nonprofits for tax-deductibility reasons. We also consider this when prioritizing some research areas above others. We’re uncertain about the tradeoffs we make when deciding how to prioritize research (see Appendix: Additional uncertainties ). We plan to reassess our approach in 2023 to ensure our research capacity is focused on where we can have the most impact. Our research process Over the past year, we estimate we spent around 6,000 hours searching for, identifying, evaluating, and publishing research on our recommendations.[ 6 ] To identify our 2022 top recommendations , we followed a six-step process, illustrated and detailed below. Assess philanthropy landscape: Before considering specific interventions or organizations, we created a list of potential climate solutions (e.g., geothermal energy, buildings, heavy industry). We then filtered this list by solutions that might be overlooked, underfunded, and/or generally promising.[ 7 ] Identify promising strategies: Within this list, we conducted desk research to further prioritize philanthropic strategies. We used the “Importance, Tractability, and Neglectedness” framework to roughly evaluate different strategies.[ 8 ] From this exercise, we created a shortlist of high-priority philanthropic strategies for further research.[ 9 ] Organization longlist: For each shortlisted philanthropic strategy, we developed a longlist of organizations working in this space that appeared to be generally well-regarded and have the capacity to effectively absorb additional funding. Organization shallow dive: For a subset of the most promising organizations, we conducted “shallow dive” research. Shallow dives focus on understanding an organization’s general level of promise across Giving Green criteria (e.g., evidence of effectiveness) and topic-specific criteria (e.g., alignment with strategy-specific theory of change). At this stage, a priority focus is identifying any reasons an organization may ultimately not be a strong fit (e.g., limited room for more funding). Organization deep dive: For organizations with promising shallow dives, we conducted “deep dives” to thoroughly examine specific giving opportunities. A deep dive includes developing an organizational theory of change, assessing whether we believe the theory of change is likely to hold, conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis, assessing room for more funding, considering any major co-benefits or adverse effects, and making a final recommendation decision. Publish recommendations and conduct outreach: Based on our deep dives, we published shorter recommendation write-ups and conducted outreach to Giving Green donors, media outlets, and our partners in the climate change community to maximize the impact of our research. At each step of this process, we make prioritization and deprioritization decisions so that we can continually reallocate our limited research capacity to the most promising opportunities. We sometimes also jump to later steps (e.g., to check whether funding opportunities actually exist within an effort), before going back to determine whether we think we can generally be impactful in a specific space in the philanthropy landscape. For our recommendations targeted to businesses , we followed a process that was similar in spirit but involved different steps. We began by conducting user research, which informed the basis of our multi-pronged business strategy. In this process, we determined that three sets of recommendations were likely most useful for businesses: funds for catalytic carbon removal, carbon removal purchases, and carbon offset purchases. Within each of these categories, we determined the most promising sectors, created shortlists of promising initiatives in those sectors, and wrote detailed recommendations for those we believe are most cost-effective. Updates to our process and products In addition to thinking about what we should research, we’re also continually making efforts to improve how we conduct and communicate our research. Our improvements focus on two guiding principles: increasing the quality and increasing the transparency of our research. They’re also more generally informed by our values (truth-seeking, humility, transparency, collaboration), which we developed earlier this year. See below for a few examples of changes we’ve made: Formalized theory of change and research prioritization (see above): We had previously developed a high-level internal theory of change and loosely discussed it in some forums.[ 10 ] Our latest theory of change provides us with a more detailed and transparent way to assess whether and how we are reducing human suffering due to climate change. Published our mistakes: As a cornerstone to embodying our values of humility and transparency, we now have a web page devoted to sharing what we believe are substantial mistakes we’ve made along our journey. This decision was inspired by several other organizations in the Effective Altruism movement, and we hope this page helps us reflect openly about ways we can continue to improve our work.[ 11 ] Increased reasoning transparency: Since challenges and opportunities in the climate change space can be especially uncertain and complicated, we think it’s essential that we practice high reasoning transparency.[ 12 ] Our increased focus on this is hard to quantify or explicitly identify, but includes: top-line summaries, increased emphasis on decision-relevant information, stating Giving Green’s level of confidence in our assessments, and additional explanation of how we rely on and interpret different pieces of evidence we use. Increased public-facing research: As outlined in our research process, we conduct a substantial amount of back-end research on potentially promising climate efforts and organizations that we ultimately decide to deprioritize due to limited research capacity. As of November 2022, we intend to publish 15 shallow dive reports summarizing preliminary assessments of promising organizations working on nuclear, food emissions, and decarbonizing heavy industry.[ 13 ] These are especially uncertain analyses, but we’re committed to openly sharing to (a) open ourselves to critiques and feedback that might update our thinking and (b) provide a public good for others in the climate change space to build off of when conducting their own research. In 2023, we’re planning to publish more information on our earlier-stage landscape analysis and climate strategy prioritization (see Our plans for 2023 ). Expanded citations: Previously, we’d included bibliographies and some in-line links in our reports. We now include endnote citations for all information we cite, so that readers can more easily follow our reasoning and learn more. We know there’s much more we can do to continually improve our process and products, and plan to focus more on this in the years to come (see Our plans for 2023 ). Our 2022 recommendations Top recommendations We think our top recommendations are the most important way we can have impact. Though there is inherent uncertainty in assessing and comparing the cost-effectiveness of many of these funding opportunities, we believe these recommendations represent organizations and initiatives that can be highly effective with additional philanthropic funding. Re-evaluation of previous US policy recommendations Historically, we focused our limited research capacity on US policy recommendations.[ 14 ] We re-evaluated these recommendations primarily based on (a) a shifting opportunity landscape, (b) a shifting political landscape, and (c) organization-specific changes. For past recommendations focused on passing US federal policy, we also specifically re-evaluated whether and how these organizations planned to shift strategies in light of the recent passing of the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.[ 15 ] Given the high likelihood that the Republican party would regain control of the House in the November 2022 midterm elections, we placed additional emphasis on organizations that could continue to be successful without a Democratic trifecta.[ 16 ] For organization-specific changes, we paid close attention to criteria that might’ve changed over the past year, such as whether an organization’s success may have crowded in additional funding and reduced its overall room for more funding. Re-recommendation: Clean Air Task Force Giving Green classifies Clean Air Task Force (CATF) as one of our top recommendations to reduce climate change. CATF is a nonprofit that advocates for public policies that (1) invest in climate-protecting technologies (e.g., low-emission energy sources), (2) curb fossil fuel emissions, or (3) enact pollution regulations. Although it continues to lead on US policy advocacy, it has also scaled its work on technology innovation and commercialization to a global level. We recommend Clean Air Task Force (CATF) because of its strong track record of policy accomplishments at the national level (including policies with bipartisan support), its growing international model, its focus on relatively neglected issue areas, the strength of its staff, and its ability to productively absorb additional funds in coming years. We previously recommended CATF in 2021 and 2020. For more information, see our Clean Air Task Force deep dive research report and Clean AIr Task Force rcommendation summary . Re-recommendation: Evergreen Collaborative Giving Green classifies Evergreen Collaborative as one of our top recommendations to reduce climate change. Evergreen Collaborative is a left-of-center insider policy advocacy group that was founded by former staffers of Washington State Governor Jay Inslee’s 2020 presidential campaign. Since its founding, Evergreen has focused its efforts on supporting policies that aim to power the economy with 100% clean energy, invest in jobs, support environmental justice, transition the US from fossil fuels, and influence US leadership to confront climate change. We first recommended Evergreen Collaborative in 2021, and focused our initial analysis on its federal legislative work. Evergreen successfully advocated for many initiatives that were included in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) such as clean energy tax credits, the green bank, and environmental justice block grants. Following the passage of the IRA, Evergreen Collaborative is now planning to work on bill implementation, state-level policy, and influencing the Biden Administration and federal agencies to take further action on climate. We think Evergreen Collaborative will be impactful in these areas, given its track record of success, organizational strengths, strategic approach, and emphasis on aligning its work to what is most politically tractable. For more information, see our Evergreen Collaborative deep dive research report and Evergreen Collaborative recommendation summary . No longer recommending: Carbon180 Based on our re-evaluation, we decided to no longer include Carbon180 as a top recommendation. Our assessment is that Carbon180 has been highly effective in advancing its mission and securing additional funding, which suggests marginal donations may be less cost-effective relative to our other recommendations. Our impression is that carbon removal, in general, has also gained substantial philanthropic attention over the past year, and we believe it will continue to be a major focus of climate donors. In particular, we think the recent passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act increased the visibility of and financial support for carbon removal projects, and may pave the way for additional philanthropic support for carbon removal advocacy. We could be wrong if Carbon180 has longer-term room for more funding, recent carbon removal policy support increases the leverage of philanthropic dollars, or carbon removal becomes less of a philanthropic and government focus in the years to come. We plan to continue to monitor this, and are looking forward to following Carbon180’s progress. For more information, see our Carbon180 deep dive research report . New top recommendations Thanks to additional research capacity, we also expanded our recommendations to include new efforts we view to be especially promising: food systems, nuclear energy, and decarbonizing heavy industry. In general, these recommendations continue to focus on two overlapping strategies we consider to be highly cost-effective: policy advocacy and technology. In cases where these recommendations have a geographic focus, we assessed whether these efforts might result in global impact, e.g. by developing model regulation that could be replicated elsewhere or advancing technology that could be scaled worldwide. Food systems: The Good Food Institute Giving Green classifies the Good Food Institute (GFI) as one of our top recommendations to reduce climate change. Currently, livestock emissions play an outsized role in food emissions and are expected to increase in the future. Our take is that shifting demand from carbon-intensive conventional meat to alternative proteins (APs), such as plant-based and cultivated meat, could lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. GFI is a nonprofit that seeks to make APs competitive with conventional meat in terms of price and taste.[ 17 ] It supports AP development through scientific research, policy advocacy, and corporate engagement in the US and abroad. We recommend GFI based on its accomplishments, organizational strengths, strategic approach, and cost-effectiveness. We believe GFI has substantial room to grow in its three programmatic areas and across its various offices, and that it will increase the likelihood of alternative proteins going mainstream. Since AP production is still in its early stages, we plan to continue to monitor APs’ climate impact and look forward to following GFI’s efforts in this space. For more information, see our Good Food Institute deep dive research report and Good Food Institute recommendation summary . Nuclear energy: Good Energy Collective Giving Green classifies Good Energy Collective (GEC) as one of our top recommendations to reduce climate change. GEC is a policy research organization that supports “advanced” nuclear reactors, which are designed to be safer, cheaper, and more versatile than traditional reactors. Nuclear power can decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions if it replaces or avoids dirtier energy sources. For example, it can reduce emissions by complementing renewables because, unlike wind and solar power, nuclear power can produce steady electricity regardless of seasonal or environmental factors. GEC advocates for progressive US policies that support equitable advanced reactor deployment, and engages with local communities to ensure there’s broad support for advanced nuclear. We believe GEC fills a neglected niche in increasing advanced reactor deployment, and that it can effectively absorb additional funding. Although GEC primarily focuses on the US, it also has an international diplomacy workstream. We believe its work could have global implications if scaled advanced nuclear power in the US gives other countries the policies, technology, and/or general confidence to also make advanced nuclear part of their clean energy portfolio. We believe GEC has substantial growth potential and that with increased funds, GEC could become more effective by adding staff and scaling its community engagement efforts. For more information, see our Good Energy Collective deep dive research report and Good Energy Collective recommendation summary . Decarbonizing heavy industry: Industrious Labs Heavy industries like steel and cement are the literal building blocks of the global economy. They account for around one-third of greenhouse gas emissions, but have not been a major focus of governments or philanthropists. Industrious Labs is a new organization dedicated to decarbonizing global heavy industry. In collaboration with partner organizations, Industrious Labs advocates to corporations to make low-carbon commitments, and applies legal and political pressure to governments to ensure there’s regulation and public funding to speed up the transition. As a new organization, Industrious Labs has a limited track record but big ambitions. We are excited about its potential for impact because it is focused on a highly neglected area, its leadership has a track record of success, and we think its comprehensive industry-specific strategies will pull on the right levers to drive industry’s transition. We also think Industrious Labs has substantial growth potential. It is building dedicated teams for each of its industry-specific campaigns, and there is considerable room to deepen existing campaigns and add new sectors. For more information, see our Industrious Labs deep dive research report and Industrious Labs recommendation summary . Our recommendations for businesses Businesses are increasingly interested in determining how they can reduce climate change.[ 18 ] However, businesses often have unique giving criteria (e.g., they may have net-zero goals or avoid donations that could be interpreted as partisan). In considering how businesses fit into our organizational theory of change (see above), we believe there is an opportunity to help businesses re-allocate funding from low-impact opportunities to higher-impact opportunities. We wrote a white paper and accompanying summary blog post outlining various high-impact corporate climate strategies that businesses can adopt, either through making investments in decarbonizing their own operations or donating to impactful organizations. In order of priority, we recommend businesses (a) consider cost-effective opportunities to directly reduce their own emissions, (b) donate to our top recommendations (see above), (c) donate to carbon removal funds, and (d) purchase high-quality carbon removal or offset credits. Our specific recommendations for businesses include making catalytic investments in carbon removal though the Frontier or Milkywire funds; buying carbon removal from Mash Makes , Charm Industrial , or Climeworks ; or buying high-quality carbon offsets from Tradewater or BURN . Key uncertainties and plans to address them We aim to be highly transparent about the uncertainties we have in our approach and research. Below, we highlight some of our key overall uncertainties, as well as ways in which we might reduce these uncertainties in 2023. For additional organizational uncertainties, see Appendix . For uncertainties specific to sectors and organizations, we list these within our “deep dive” research reports. Is there a better way to define and target human suffering due to climate change? Uncertainty: We currently use atmospheric GHG levels as a rough proxy for human suffering due to climate change. We think this is an imperfect indicator, but is relatively easy to objectively define, measure, and understand. There may, however, be ways to improve the accuracy of this proxy. For example, we might consider using climate damage functions or general estimates of the social cost of carbon.[ 19 ] Other climate change organizations compare funding opportunities based on broader outcomes (e.g., Founders Pledge focuses on “climate damage”), which gives us some confidence we may be able to better define and use our actual outcome of interest when making recommendation decisions.[ 20 ] Plan: We plan to consider ways in which we might better define our outcome of interest as part of our uncertainty regarding how we should think about climate impact today versus tomorrow (see below). How should we think about climate impact today versus tomorrow? Uncertainty: Currently, we don’t have a well-developed process for comparing the tradeoffs between current and future climate mitigation opportunities, as well as climate suffering. This is especially relevant when comparing funding opportunities targeting (a) short-lived climate pollutants versus (longer-lived) CO2 (e.g., comparing methane reductions attributable to the Good Food Institute to CO2 reductions attributable to Good Energy Collective) and (b) near-term GHG reductions versus expected future GHG reductions (e.g., business opportunities to purchase carbon removal credits today versus donating to Frontier’s advance market commitment ).[ 21 ] In our cost-effectiveness analyses, we also use a global warming potential of 100 years, which (though widely used) implicitly overweights GHG that have substantial impact within a 100-year period (e.g., refrigerants ).[ 22 ] As an initial attempt to explore part of this uncertainty, we wrote a preliminary short-lived climate pollutants report in April 2022, which we think is fairly simplistic and doesn’t take into account some new evidence.[ 23 ] We also don’t currently include a formal discount rate for future removed/avoided tCO2e. This may not actually be the best approach if, for example, we think it’s more important to reduce GHG atmospheric levels as soon as possible to avoid tipping elements.[ 24 ] On the other hand, reducing GHG atmospheric levels in a long-term worst-case scenario may actually be more important if we’re trying to avoid a scenario of going from 3 degrees to 4 degrees warming, which we think is likely to cause more human suffering than going from 2 degrees to 3 degrees of warming.[ 25 ] Overall, we currently make many qualitative implicit judgment calls on climate impact today versus tomorrow. Plan: We plan to make additional progress on this, but don’t expect to comprehensively formalize our thinking for two reasons. First, we think the majority of funding opportunities we investigate focus on relatively similar climate change reduction timelines. Second, it’s our impression that there is so much uncertainty regarding longer-term climate forecasts that it could be relatively intractable to have a higher-confidence opinion than we currently have. However, we plan to spend some additional time collecting our thoughts on this in 2023, including making updates to our short-lived climate pollutants report, better understanding the latest evidence on tipping elements, and improving our assessment of the relative neglectedness of different climate change scenarios. Within our top recommendations, what is the most cost-effective giving opportunity? Uncertainty: We currently have five top recommendations, and think some of these recommendations are probably more cost-effective than others. However, we’re uncertain about the specific cost-effectiveness of each recommendation and, thus, which recommendation is technically the most cost-effective giving opportunity. Plan: We think it’s unlikely we’d make so much progress on this that we would be able to recommend a single giving opportunity above others. Our current recommendations represent a range of giving opportunities that we think generally have similar levels of cost-effectiveness within a range of uncertainty.[ 26 ] Though some of this uncertainty is inherent to the types of recommendations we make (e.g., it is extremely difficult to understand what impact Clean Air Task Force had on the Global Methane Pledge), we plan to explore more ways to reduce relative uncertainty. For example, we may try to improve the rigor with which we compare the credibility of theories of change and/or improve our cost-effectiveness analyses.[ 27 ] Our plans for 2023 We look forward to continuing to engage with the broader climate community to learn and share in the year ahead. As always, we will remain focused on our mission to reduce human suffering due to climate change. We’ve outlined below what we think are the most important plans to execute for 2023 to advance this goal, though we will continue to remain flexible and revise priorities, accordingly. Execute plans to address key uncertainties (see above, as well as Appendix ). Publish an annual report, including an assessment of Giving Green’s operational expenses, money moved, and tCO2e removed/avoided so that we can increase our transparency on how we’re estimating Giving Green’s impact. Publish additional information on our earlier-stage landscape analysis and climate strategy prioritization. We may publish write-ups on our overall process, additional details on our methodology/reasoning, and/or lists of considered topics. Continue to expand the breadth of Giving Green’s research. For example, we may look into supply-side interventions (e.g., restricting fossil fuel financing), opportunities to support countries expected to be major future GHG emitters (e.g., India), and initiatives that are more exclusively applicable to worser-case scenarios. Expand our Australia research and outreach. Our focus on Australia has been made possible by restricted funding. We think Australia provides an exciting potential opportunity because (a) we think we can maximize donations from Australians by providing Australia-specific recommendations and (b) Australia is the world’s largest coal exporter, so there may generally be highly cost-effective giving opportunities that have a global impact. To date, our focus on Australia has been relatively capacity-constrained. In 2023, we are working with in-country partners who will hire and manage a full-time Australia coordinator to manage this workstream and more comprehensively test our hypothesis of Australia’s promisingness as an impactful audience for Giving Green. Investments: To date, we’ve made some shallow dive assessments on investment opportunities. The extent to which we focus on this work in 2023 will be influenced by funding. We may make light-touch updates to these assessments, though we are generally uncertain about (a) the impact of this analysis and (b) our relative value-add compared to others focused on climate change investments. Continue to generally improve the quality and usefulness of our work. If you have feedback, let us know! Appendix Additional uncertainties Where should we allocate our limited research capacity? Uncertainty: We have limited research capacity, and aren’t certain where it makes sense to allocate our research time. This depends on (a) how much financing we can influence in a given space and (b) how many tCO2e can be removed or avoided due to that financing. For example, we estimate our top recommendations avoid roughly one tCO2e per dollar donated. By contrast, we estimate a one-ton offset purchase via Tradewater costs around $17. As a rough heuristic, it might make sense to focus more research capacity on high-quality offset recommendations if we believe we can influence more than 17 times as much money as for our top recommendations. Plan: We don’t think it’s useful to try to improve a direct quantitative comparison such as the one above, as there are other factors that are difficult to quantify. For example: the marginal impact of an additional recommendation in the same sector (e.g., decarbonizing heavy industry ), the longer-term cost-effectiveness of early-stage funding for relatively expensive initiatives (e.g., direct air capture ), or the potential longer-term upside of reaching a broader audience by researching high-interest topics (e.g., forestry offsets ). However, we plan to more generally consider heuristics and guiding principles for how we allocate research capacity, which we hope will allow us to be more thoughtful and transparent about how we allocate research capacity. In mid-2023, we expect to make deliberate decisions about how much to focus on top recommendations versus other expectations for the 2023 giving season. What is Giving Green’s marginal value add? Uncertainty: Currently, we use money directed as a rough proxy for our impact. However, this doesn’t clearly (a) explain how we estimate, in the absence of Giving Green, the counterfactual impact of money influenced by Giving Green and (b) estimate the ultimate tCO2e removed/avoided. Plan: In 2023, we plan to publish an annual report that details how we estimate our marginal impact, estimates of pessimistic/optimistic/best guess impact scenarios, as well as provide an estimate of tCO2e removed/avoided due to Giving Green. Endnotes [1] Rough estimate, calculated by reviewing topics listed under Giving Green’s “Research” dropdown menu as of 2022-10. See US Policy Change | Giving Green's Research ; Australian Policy Change ; Carbon Offsets & Removals | Giving Green's Research ; Investments | Giving Green's Research . [ 2 ] See Recommendations | Where to Give | Giving Green for a current list of our recommendations. [3] To estimate the influence of our recommendations, we gather information from a few different sources: recommended organizations (e.g., Clean Air Task Force), donation platforms that use our advice (e.g., Sweden’s Ge Effektivt), and donors, themselves. We then estimate how much of the donation is directly attributable to Giving Green (i.e., how much of the donation would have occurred in the absence of Giving Green). We also make pessimistic and optimistic guesses, which currently give us a range of $1.3M-$4.9M. In 2023, we plan to publish our first annual report, which will outline our methodology and estimates in more detail (see What’s next). [4] See Investments | Giving Green's Research . [ 5 ] See Appendix: Additional uncertainties for additional commentary on why we view these research areas to be high-interest, and why we might be wrong about allocating limited research capacity to these topics. [ 6 ] This is roughly based on 2.5 FTE from January through May 2022, and 4.5 FTE from June to mid-November 2022. Calculation: ((2.5*5)+(4.5*6.5))*148 [hours per month] = 6,179. [ 7 ] This list, in various forms, has been in development since Giving Green’s inception. However, its 2022 refinement was primarily split into three stages: development (January - May 2022); filtering (June 2022, including an all-staff retreat); prioritization (June - September 2022). We developed this list via both quantitative and qualitative means. For example, we used Project Drawdown’s solutions list and roughly calculated potential cost-effectiveness based on net first costs to implement the solution and potential tCO2e avoided in different climate scenarios. We also added solutions based on overview documents (e.g., government decarbonization strategies ) and emerging evidence (e.g., feasibility assessments ). We also relied on interviews with key climate stakeholders, including philanthropists, researchers, and policy experts. As part of our expected 2023 updates, we plan to publish a longer list of potential climate solutions we have considered, or may consider in the future. [ 8 ] For a fuller explanation of this framework, see ITN framework - EA Forum . This framework is a commonly-used approach to evaluate which issue areas to work on across a variety of domains, particularly among those using Effective Altruism methods. [9] This process happened concurrently with our assessment of the philanthropy landscape. For example, our philanthropy landscape assessment flagged nuclear policy as a potential climate solution, and our promising strategy identification highlighted the potential importance of advanced nuclear policy advocacy. Our 2022 refinement was primarily split into three stages: development (January - May 2022); filtering (June 2022, including an all-staff retreat); prioritization (June - September 2022). As part of our expected 2023 updates, we plan to publish a longer list of potential climate solutions we have considered, or may consider in the future. [ 10 ] For example, see Climate Recommendations in EA: Giving Green and Founders Pledge . [ 11 ] For example, see Our Mistakes | GiveWell and Our mistakes - 80,000 Hours . [ 12 ] For more on reasoning transparency, see Open Philanthropy: Reasoning Transparency (2017) . [ 13 ] These shallow dives include research on organizations working in food sector emissions , decarbonizing heavy industry , and nuclear power . [ 14 ] For example, see Giving Green's Approach to Policy Change Recommendations (Wayback Internet Archive 2022-11-01) . [ 15 ] This is primarily based on 10+ conversations with policy stakeholders, among whom there was broad consensus that no major climate change legislation will pass until 2025 at the earliest; Inflation Reduction Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text ; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text . [16] Our assessment of whether an organization could continue to be successful was based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis. We conducted interviews with experts (including politicians, political staff, and climate philanthropists), used proxies (e.g., whether the organization participates in a coalition self-identifying as bipartisan), and assigned scores to organizations’ bipartisan engagement. To assess the likelihood of no Democratic trifecta, we primarily relied on FiveThirtyEight 2022 election forecasts . Though likelihoods varied over time, forecasts have consistently predicted that Democrats would lose the trifecta. For example, a 2022-11-01 forecast (Wayback Internet Archive) estimated an 18% chance that Democrats win both chambers. [ 17 ] GFI has 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) entities. As Giving Green is part of IDinsight, which is itself a charitable, tax-exempt organization, we are only offering an opinion on the charitable activities of GFI’s 501(c)(3) arm, and not on GFI’s 501(c)(4) entity. [ 18 ] For example, a 2021 McKinsey report found that the number of corporate net-zero commitments doubled between 2019 and 2020, and estimated that the carbon credit market could increase by a factor of 15 by 2030 to around $50 billion. For additional information, see McKinsey: A blueprint for scaling voluntary carbon markets to meet the climate challenge, 2021 . [19] For example, Diaz and Moore 2017 summarizes climate damage modeling approaches and their limitations. Halstead’s 2022 “ Climate Change & Longtermism: new book-length report ” includes a review of evidence estimating the social cost of carbon. [20] “This leads to what might be a surprising conclusion -- the goal of high-impact climate philanthropy is not to maximize emissions reductions but to minimize climate damage.” Navigating the changing landscape of climate philanthropy | Founders Pledge . [21] “[Short-lived climate pollutants] persist for a short time in the atmosphere but can be extremely potent in terms of their global warming potential compared to long-lasting greenhouse gases such as CO2.” World Bank: Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, 2014 . [22] “The Global Warming Potential (GWP) was developed to allow comparisons of the global warming impacts of different gases. Specifically, it is a measure of how much energy the emissions of 1 ton of a gas will absorb over a given period of time, relative to the emissions of 1 ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). The larger the GWP, the more that a given gas warms the Earth compared to CO2 over that time period. The time period usually used for GWPs is 100 years.” Understanding Global Warming Potentials | US EPA . “The time period usually used for GWPs is 100 years” Understanding Global Warming Potentials | US EPA . For additional information on refrigerants, see our refrigerants report . [23] For example, it doesn’t take into account emerging evidence on “tipping elements” (e.g., McKay et al 2022 ) or how reducing short-term warming could “bend the curve” on longer-term warming (e.g., Carmichael et al 2013 ). [24] For example, McKay et al 2022 suggests that some tippling elements may be likely to occur within relatively low temperature increases. We haven’t investigated this literature in detail, and it’s our understanding that the exact likelihood and expected damage of tipping elements is highly debated. “Current global warming of ~1.1°C above pre-industrial already lies within the lower end of five [climate tipping point] uncertainty ranges.” McKay et al 2022 . [25] For more on probabilities of temperature increases, see Raftery et al 2017 , Figure 3. [26] As a heuristic, we consider something to plausibly be within the range of cost-effectiveness we would consider for a top recommendation if its estimated cost-effectiveness is within an order of magnitude of $1/tCO2e (i.e., less than $10/tCO2e). [27] Examples of ways we might try to improve our CEAs: conduct higher-quality sensitivity checks; include (better) leverage and funging estimates (for an explanation of these terms, see: Revisiting leverage - The GiveWell Blog ); improve the precision/accuracy with which we estimate policy advocacy influence.

Cutting short-lived climate pollutants // BACK This report was last updated in April 2022. Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) do not last as long as carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, but they are much more potent at trapping heat. Despite its short term effects, early SLCP mitigation is essential in terms of (1) keeping global temperature change below 2°C over the next few decades and (2) buying more time for the current generation to adapt to climate change and its effects. It is especially important to direct resources toward SLCP solutions where there is no clear pathway toward success given current technology, as these emissions sources will remain for the visible future. However, SLCP mitigation is an inadequate substitute for aggressive CO2 mitigation because, unlike SLCPs, CO2 can last in the atmosphere for centuries to millennia. Therefore, SLCP and CO2 mitigation must be done in tandem. Existing technologies can significantly reduce SLCP emissions by 2030, and there are additional methods and technologies under development that could help further control concentrations of SLCPs in the atmosphere. It seems likely that, on the whole, cutting SLCPs is not neglected because major foundations have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to reduce global methane (CH4) emissions, which is the most abundant SLCP. However, there may still be pockets of need. For example, CH4 leaks from oil and gas production will likely be well-covered, but there is not a clear pathway toward reducing CH4 emissions from livestock. Giving Green will investigate SLCPs further (with a focus on reducing livestock emissions), but we need more information on how foundations have prioritized CH4 solutions to assess neglectedness. This report is also available in PDF format: 2022-04 Cutting Short-Lived Climate Pollutants .pdf Download PDF • 7.70MB Image: Mike Benna Background Short-lived climate pollutants only persist for a short period. SLCPs are greenhouse gases (GHGs) that persist in the atmosphere for a shorter period than long-lived climate pollutants (LLCPs), such as CO2 and nitrous oxide (N2O). A brief description of the main LLCPs and SLCPs follow in the table below. Our report primarily focuses on CH4 because it is the most abundant SLCP. Table 1: Main long-lived and short-lived climate pollutants. *Values are based on a 100-year global warming potential value. Mt refers to million tonnes. For calculations, please refer to our “Short-lived climate pollutant emissions [2022]” spreadsheet. The main SLCPs are more potent than CO2. Although SLCPs are short-lived, the main SLCPs are many times more potent than CO2 at trapping heat. A common metric for measuring a GHG’s potency is its global warming potential (GWP), which measures the heat absorbed by a GHG compared to the heat absorbed by an equal mass of CO2. GWP is time-dependent, and its subscript denotes the number of years over which its potential is calculated. Table 2: Global warming potential of various greenhouse gases SLCP mitigation must be done alongside CO2 mitigation. Mitigating SLCP should not substitute efforts to drive CO2 emissions to zero. CO2 has a lifetime of up to thousands of years, so CO2 will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere if its emissions are not zeroed out. Early SLCP mitigation will have little impact on peak warming unless this effort is accompanied by ambitious reductions in CO2 emissions (Figure 1). Some have argued that reducing SLCPs will delay when we reach climate tipping points, which are thresholds that will lead to irreversible climate damage when they are exceeded. However, the exact definition of tipping points and when we would reach one remain controversial. Additionally, it seems likely that mitigating SLCPs would only delay when we reach tipping points by a few decades so long as the concentration of atmospheric CO2 continues to rise (Shoemaker et al., 2013). In short, reducing SLCPs without mitigating CO2 would prioritize the current generation (e.g., buy time for climate adaptation) over future generations. Even though delayed SLCP emissions may have less of an effect on warming than delayed CO2 emissions, it is still necessary to eventually mitigate SLCP emissions. This need for mitigation and flexible timing suggest that research and development (R&D) into mitigating hard-to-abate SLCP emissions could be a promising area to investigate. Figure 1: Idealized scenario of change in global warming when cuts to CO2 and/or SLCP are either delayed or early. Delaying CO2 mitigation would lead to CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere (Allen, 2015). Importance Reducing SLCP emissions now would substantially impact the rate of temperature change over the next few decades because SLCPs are more potent than CO2; if SLCP emissions are allowed to persist, they will continue to cause warming. Notably, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that CH4 alone is responsible for 30 percent of the rise in global temperatures since the Industrial Revolution (IEA, 2022). According to the Global Methane Assessment, human-driven CH4 emissions can be reduced by 45 percent by 2030, and this reduction will help keep the world on track for keeping global warming under 1.5 ° C compared to pre-industrial times (United Nations Environment Programme and Climate and Clean Air Coalition, 2021). This report primarily focuses on CH4 emissions because it is the most abundant SLCP and is widely considered to be the second most important GHG after CO2. However, it is not the only SLCP that we are interested in. For example, our 2020 and 2021 recommendations included Tradewater, which destroys HFC refrigerants. We are less concerned about black carbon as a climate pollutant because it only lasts in the atmosphere for a matter of days. Additionally, despite black carbon’s high GWP, reducing its atmospheric concentration may not be especially effective in reducing global surface air temperatures (Takemura & Suzuki, 2019). This is likely because heating due to black carbon is quickly compensated for by rapid changes in the atmosphere, such as changes in clouds, precipitation, and relative humidity. Tractability There are existing tools for driving SLCP emissions down. Numerous existing technologies and practices can reduce SLCP emissions, as described in the table below: Table 3: Existing solutions for removing or avoiding SLCPs Methane mitigation and removal Existing technologies can reduce global methane emissions by 57 percent by 2030 (Ocko et al., 2021). Moreover, almost a quarter of these emissions can be eliminated at no net cost. Plugging CH4 leaks from pipelines and wells is low-hanging fruit. IEA argued that plans to reduce CH4 should initially focus on oil and gas leaks (IEA, 2021), which contributes to more than a quarter of methane emissions (Ritchie & Roser, 2020). Indeed, mitigating most CH4 emissions from oil and gas production by 2030 is economically feasible (Ocko et al., 2021) (Figure 2). Figure 2: Estimated global anthropogenic methane emissions in 2030 (Ocko et al., 2021). This estimate does not include behavioral change, which could increase mitigation potential. Most livestock emissions remain unsolved. Even if all CH4 emissions abatement strategies were deployed, there would still be a large residual of unabated livestock emissions in 2030 (Ocko et al., 2021). Livestock emissions will most likely continue to grow because global meat consumption will likely continue rising. The fastest growth in meat consumption will most likely happen in low- and middle-income countries experiencing rising incomes (Blaustein-Rejto & Smith, 2021). Currently, animal products are responsible for 22, 65, and 70 percent of diet-related emissions in lower-middle–, upper-middle–, and high-income countries, respectively (Behrens et al., 2017). Livestock emissions can be slashed by reducing meat consumption, decreasing ruminant emissions (e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats), and shrinking food waste and loss. Ruminant emissions can be curbed both directly and indirectly. Direct techniques include feeding ruminants additives with methane inhibitors; indirect methods include improving livestock productivity. Increasing CH4 removal from the atmosphere is challenging. Natural processes destroy 10 percent of CH4 in the atmosphere every year (Turner et al., 2019). In particular, oxidation breaks CH4 molecules’ covalent bonds, such as when CH4 reacts with chlorine atoms or hydroxyl radicals. Researchers are developing new technologies and practices that could enhance methane removal (Barber, 2022), such as the following: Spraying iron salts to draw chlorine atoms out of the ocean air, Using thermal towers to suck in air and break down methane through photocatalysis (sunlight and metal catalysts), and Trapping methane in zeolite pores and oxidizing the molecules with heat, oxygen, and metal catalysts (Jackson et al., 2019). However, removing CH4 from the atmosphere is challenging because it is incredibly dilute. Additionally, it would be immensely challenging to scale CH4 removal in a way that would compete with natural processes. According to Klaus Lackner, a pioneer in carbon removal technologies, “To substantially enhance natural processes, methane removal units would have to process the entire atmosphere in less than a decade” (Lackner, 2020). He argued that reducing CH4 emissions may be easier than removing CH4 from the atmosphere. Neglectedness There has been an international movement towards reducing CH4 emissions. Numerous countries have pledged to slash CH4 emissions by 30 percent by 2030. In 2020, more than 30 countries signed onto the Global Methane Pledge, agreeing to cut global methane emissions by at least 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030 (Friedman, 2021). If successful, this pledge could achieve annual reductions of 145 million metric tons of CH4 (Nesbit, 2021). Using a 100-year GWP value, this is equal to about 4 billion metric tons of CO2-equivalent. The pledge includes nine of the world’s top 20 CH4 polluters but does not include the four heaviest emitters of CH4: China, India, Russia, and Brazil. The US EPA has made strides towards reducing CH4 leaks from oil and gas production. In November 2021, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a new set of CH4 rules that would require oil and gas companies to monitor and address leaks from existing and future wells (US EPA, 2021). This set of rules would cover about 75 percent of all CH4 emissions in the US. However, there may be lengthy delays before these rules are implemented as EPA gathers public comments and opponents launch lawsuits. Additionally, a future president could reverse these rules if a Republican takes the White House. The oil and gas industry has been involved in reducing CH4 emissions. The United Nations Environment Programme and the European Commission launched the International Methane Emissions Observatory to coordinate CH4 reduction efforts. The observatory will access estimated emissions inventories from both governments and industries (Nature, 2021). Funders have pledged hundreds of millions towards reducing CH4 emissions. Over 20 philanthropic organizations have pledged about $328 million to support reducing CH4 emissions (William + Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2021). Funders involved in this effort will coordinate “methane reduction solutions, providing expertise, financial resources, technical support, and best-in-class data to ensure methane reduction progress and accurate monitoring, verification, and reporting, including in the resource extraction and agriculture sectors.” It is unclear how the foundations will allocate funds towards different causes. Therefore, we cannot tell what aspects of addressing CH4 emissions will be most neglected. However, we suspect that early efforts will focus on the oil and gas industry because there appears to be a broad consensus that plugging leaks is low-hanging fruit for mitigating CH4. CH4 emissions from livestock may remain neglected. Efforts like developing animal feed that reduces ruminant emissions are in their early R&D phase. We suspect that research into livestock emissions may be relatively neglected and have room for more funding because it is a less sure bet than reducing emissions from oil and gas leaks. For example, a discussion paper released in November 2021 called for a $100 million investment into multi-year tests of animal feed that would reduce methane production (Searchinger et al., 2021). Conclusion Reducing CH4 emissions is important and tractable, but on the whole, it may not be neglected given the significant amount of philanthropic funding pouring into this space. We need further information on the philanthropic landscape for CH4 before we can accurately assess room for more funding. Currently, it seems likely that we should deprioritize investigations into plugging leaks from oil and gas pipelines and wells because that appears to be well-covered ground. However, there may be neglected areas within CH4 reduction, specifically reducing CH4 emissions from ruminants. This could include technological fixes that reduce enteric fermentation, or policy or technology that lead to less meat consumption. We find these pathways promising as areas for philanthropic investment and intend to investigate them further. We also plan on investigating other SLCPs in the future. Download the full report at the top of this page to access the full list of works cited. This report last updated April 21, 2022. Questions and comments are welcome.