Why are We Focusing on Low- and Middle-Income Countries? Giving Green’s mission is to improve human and ecological wellbeing. We aim to increase funding for high-impact strategies that reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, thereby mitigating the negative effects of climate change on people and the planet. We recognize that climate change is a global issue requiring a global response; hence we adopt an international approach to identifying and promoting the most high-leverage and cost-effective mitigation strategies worldwide.
Overall, we think it is important to address emissions in both High-Income Countries (HICs) and Low- and Middle Income Countries (LMICs). We take a nuanced approach that considers their respective emissions trajectories in addition to the moral imperative for HICs to lead on emissions reduction and the need to position decarbonization in LMICs in the broader context of energy access, energy security, and economic growth.
Emissions trajectories in HICs and LMICs. High-Income Countries (HICs) hold a central role in depleting the global carbon budget.1 HICs are responsible for 57% of global cumulative emissions, amounting to 1 trillion tons.2 In 2022, emissions per capita averaged 10.1 tons in HICs in contrast to 0.3 tons in Low-Income Countries (LICs).3 In simpler terms, on average, a single person in an HIC emits more than 30 times as much as an individual in an LIC.4 Due to the high emission levels, we think there is significant scope for reducing emissions in HICs. Additionally, mitigation strategies in HICs can be particularly cost-effective, especially when emission levels are high.5
Given the historical and current emission levels, we acknowledge the moral imperative of HICs to lead the way in greenhouse gas emission reductions. In parallel, we recognize that this alone may not be sufficient. Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) play an important role in ensuring that we do not surpass the 1.5-degree target.6 LMICs, when excluding China, are expected to account for the majority of the world’s annual greenhouse gas emissions by 2040.7 We think the role of LMICs is especially paramount given the rate of increasing emissions in these regions (Figure 1 ).8
Figure 1: Share of global CO2 emissions between Low, Lower Middle, Upper Middle, and High-Income Countries9Emissions and economic growth. The rise in emissions in LMICs has closely followed their economic and demographic growth trajectories.10 As these economies continue to grow, their carbon emissions are expected to increase further.11 Rising incomes in MICs were associated with an increased demand for consumer durables, thereby boosting electricity and energy consumption.12 For instance, doubling personal real income increased the probability of an individual owning a vehicle by 9.6%, with similar trends observed in the ownership of air conditioners, refrigerators, or cell phones.13 Further, emissions in LMICs are expected to rise with a growing demand for transportation services.14 Hence, as LMICs continue to develop economically, decarbonization efforts will be central to mitigating a steep increase in emissions.
Cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies. Even though, as acknowledged earlier, climate change mitigation strategies may be more cost-effective when emissions are higher, we think certain strategies may be cheaper in LMICs. For example, inputs such as land or labor may be more cost-effective, leading to an overall lower cost of implementation in LMICs compared to HICs.15 We think many cost-effective low-carbon strategies that remain untapped in LMICs could bring in more development opportunities. These untapped opportunities are often referred to as "low-hanging fruit" because they may be relatively easy to implement and have the potential to substantially reduce emissions.16 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that not all “untapped opportunities” are desirable or feasible to implement. We note that in certain scenarios, environmental policies may conflict with economic growth efforts, as they may impose additional costs and risks or negatively influence innovation, productivity, or profits.17
We believe that decarbonization in LMICs needs to be positioned in the broader context of expanding access to energy and guaranteeing energy security and basic services without hindering economic growth. We are interested in exploring climate change mitigation strategies to reduce emissions in LMICs while keeping economic and developmental priorities in mind.
Why Did We Prioritize India and Indonesia? Given the small size of the research team at Giving Green and our limited bandwidth, we had to make difficult decisions and select priority countries. We followed a step-by-step approach to identify high-priority countries and assign them to three priority tiers, as described below.
We first compiled a comprehensive list of LMICs using the most recent World Bank Atlas categorization, filtering out all countries categorized as “High income.” This step yielded 131 LMICs18 , from which we aimed to identify up to 10 for further consideration.
Motivated by our Scale, Feasibility, and Funding Need framework, we identified suitable data to inform a list of criteria for country prioritization, which we describe below and present in our Country Prioritization spreadsheet .
Scale: To assess scale, we gathered country-level data on current emissions and per capita emissions, as well as projected 2050 emissions.19 We used two selection criteria for evaluating scale: one centered on overall emissions, and one that places greater weight on emissions per capita. The former reflects the influence that national governments may have on overall emissions trajectories through national policy, while the latter acknowledges that more targeted sector-level or microeconomic interventions may be promising in countries with high per capita emissions, provided that a country has relatively high overall emissions. Selection criteria 1: We first narrowed our list to countries with current emissions in the top 25% among LMICs. Then we selected the countries whose projected absolute emissions in 2050 under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario are in the top 25% of this subset.20 Countries that passed Scale selection criteria 1: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, VietnamSelection criteria 2: We first selected LMICs that ranked in the top 50% of total emitters and the top 25% of per capita emitters. From this subset, we then further selected countries whose projected 2050 BAU emissions are in the top 50%. Countries that passed Scale selection criteria 2: China, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam Feasibility: We then excluded countries with presumed low feasibility based on the Global Philanthropy Environment Index (GPEI).21 We excluded countries with an “Overall” GPEI score below 3 out of 5, resulting in outcomes that roughly aligned with our own assessments of our ability to conduct due diligence (in part due to language barriers) and to direct funding to organizations in these countries effectively. Countries that also passed the Feasibility criterion: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia (missing data), Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand Funding need assessment: The existence of and approach to assessing funding need estimates is highly variable.22 We crudely assessed funding need by estimating the combined public, private, and philanthropic sector climate funding as a percentage of overall funding need. We did so by first identifying relatively recent estimates23 of climate funding and overall need from Climate Policy Initiative and other sources, as well as climate philanthropic funding from ClimateWorks.24 We then divided total climate funding by funding need. However, the lack of a common data source within and across countries makes us cautious about over-interpreting this data, which we interpret as indicating that none of the countries in the list above are more than halfway to meeting their annual climate funding needs.Given our team’s limited size and resources, we created prioritization tiers for the remaining countries.25 For our highest priority countries (Tier 1), we planned to pursue active country-specific research and outreach, while for countries in Tier 2 we would begin more passively gathering further information to consider expanding our Tier 1 list in the future. For countries in Tier 3, we planned to consider promising funding opportunities that came across our radar. Country tiers and sources for the country-level information below can be found in our Country Prioritization spreadsheet .
Table 1: Tiered country prioritization26In Tier 1, we prioritized India and Indonesia due to these countries’ exceedingly high emissions. Both are among the top ten global emitters, and each includes sectors with projected 2050 emissions that exceed the current emissions of any other country on our shortlist.
India: With emissions totaling over 3 billion MtCO2 in 2023, India is the third-largest global emitter (excluding land use change), behind China and the United States, and has the highest emissions among LMICs deemed feasible for philanthropic influence. Under BAU, the most emitting sector in 2050 is expected to be energy, emitting 4.3 GtCO2, followed by industry (2.6 GtCO2) and transport (1.1 GtCO2). Climate Policy Initiative estimates that India’s annual funding need to achieve its NDC is $170 billion, while its current yearly funding is around $50 billion, indicating an annual shortfall of around $120 billion.Indonesia: Indonesia emitted 733 MtCO2 in 2023, making it the eighth-highest emitter globally (excluding land use change) and the second-highest emissions among LMICs we deemed feasible for philanthropic influence. Under BAU, the most emitting sector in 2050 is expected to be energy, emitting 1.9 GtCO2, followed by agriculture (863 MtCO2) and industry (448 MtCO2). We estimate with low certainty that annual climate funding in Indonesia totals around $10-15 billion, while CPI’s bottom-up climate finance need data suggests a yearly need of $47 billion, indicating an annual shortfall of around $35 billion. In Tier 2, we will continue to explore Mexico and South Africa, given their relatively high emissions and emissions per capita among LMICs:
Mexico: Mexico emitted 483 MtCO2 in 2023 (on par with Brazil’s 486 MtCO2), making it the 13th highest global emitter (excluding land use change). Mexico is the only country to pass both of our scale criteria, indicating that it has both relatively high overall and per capita emissions. Under BAU, the most emitting sector in 2050 is expected to be industry, with emissions of 468 MtCO2. We estimate with low certainty that annual climate funding in Mexico totals around $2-4 billion, while CPI’s bottom-up climate finance need data suggests a yearly need of $17 billion, indicating an annual shortfall of around $13 billion.South Africa: South Africa emitted 402 MtCO2 in 2023, making it the 15th-highest global emitter (excluding land use change). It has the second-highest per capita emissions among countries that passed our scale and feasibility criteria (behind Malaysia) at 6.4 MtCO2 per person in 2023. Under BAU, the most emitting sector in 2050 is expected to be energy, with emissions of 311.6 MtCO2. Climate Policy Initiative estimates that South Africa’s annual funding need to achieve its net-zero goal by 2050 is $31 billion, while its current yearly funding is around $6 billion, indicating an annual shortfall of around $25 billion.As for Tier 3, Brazil , Malaysia , Pakistan , and Thailand remain of particular interest, particularly in the sectors that are on track to have the most emissions by 2050 (agriculture in Brazil, energy in Malaysia, agriculture or industry in Pakistan, and industry in Thailand). Given that we have previously prioritized emissions from food systems and industry, we may favor opportunities in these countries in our other Giving Green philanthropic strategies.
Data Limitations Several sources either lack complete data on all countries or do not make data publicly available, so we exclude data for several countries that do not meet our early inclusion criteria. For example, we use data from World Data Lab to identify countries with high business-as-usual emissions in 2050, though given that the data required manual entry, we only entered data for countries in the top 50% of current LMIC emitters, which did not preclude this analysis but may prevent additional useful approaches to slicing the data. We lack data on the available climate finance and funding need for many countries, and the data we managed to identify for countries that stand out based on our “scale” assessment comes from multiple sources that may use different approaches. For instance, we used funding need data from CPI’s Bottom-up Climate Finance Needs dataset—which collates climate finance needs data from countries’ NDCs and other official documentation—for several countries, while we used other CPI data for countries where bottom-up data is not available or leads to misleading conclusions. Even if we had this bottom-up data for all countries in our dataset, countries use different approaches to estimate their climate finance needs.27 The lack of a globally accepted definition of climate finance needs therefore weakens our assessment.28 Why Did We Focus on the Electricity Sector? We would like to support systems change interventions spanning diverse climate impact areas in India and Indonesia. As part of our research process, we completed an assessment of the most promising impact areas for the Giving Green Fund in 2024 . Per our assessment, we are open to advancing India’s and Indonesia’s nonprofits working towards industrial decarbonization, decreasing livestock emissions, carbon removal, nuclear power, geothermal power, or solar geoengineering governance and coordination.
Alongside the Giving Green global priorities, we decided to focus on the electricity sector in India and Indonesia due to its significant impact on emissions and its potential for a high-impact role in the clean energy transition. By clean energy transition, we are referring to replacing high-carbon fossil fuels with low-carbon clean energy, mainly consisting of renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, or hydropower.29
As of 2021, electricity and heat production were the key sources of emissions in both India and Indonesia. In India, the electricity and heat production sector accounted for 51.2% of total CO2 emissions, followed by industry, transport, and residential emissions (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2: CO2 emissions by sector, India, 202130Similarly, in Indonesia, the largest source of emissions is electricity and heat producers at 43.2%, followed by industry, transport and residential emissions (Figure 3 ).
Figure 3: CO2 emissions by sector, Indonesia, 202131Given that the electricity and heat-producing sector is the main emitter in India and Indonesia, we wanted to understand whether emissions mitigation in this sector is feasible to support. This includes assessing whether it is a government priority, whether nonprofits working in space could be influential at the policy level, and whether philanthropic funding could be impactful.
The Opportunity to Decarbonize the Electricity Sector in India In India, the government has outlined an ambitious climate action plan, Panchamrit , which includes targets such as reaching 500 GW of non-fossil-fuel energy capacity by 2030 and achieving net-zero emissions by 2070.32 Between 2015 and 2022, India issued the highest number of climate policies among all countries: over 50 policies, ranging from production-linked incentive schemes to policies promoting solar panels.33 As of 2024, India had the 4th largest renewable energy installed capacity worldwide.34 The Indian government has implemented policies to accelerate the electricity transition, such as transmission projects to transport renewable energy or new regulations to improve clean energy integration in the electricity grid.35
Some of India’s other priorities compete with mitigation. Namely, while substantial progress has been made in increasing renewable energy, coal plays an important role in energy security,36 and 2023 was a record-high year in the amount of domestic coal production and coal imports.37 Further, there are plans to add new coal capacity in the upcoming years.38 The pace of the electricity transition is also uneven among states.39
We acknowledge that the clean energy transition is a priority for the Indian government. To that end, we think nonprofits can play a crucial role in collaborating with the government to find low-carbon pathways to advancing energy security. Our qualitative scoping with philanthropies revealed funding gaps in the energy ecosystem, particularly in research and knowledge creation, indicating that organizations could benefit from additional catalytic funding.40 However, we do acknowledge that we may be reflecting a bias of international funders by focusing on the electricity sector over other underfunded and under-prioritized efforts, such as adaptation or conservation (see “Key uncertainties and open questions ”).
The Opportunity to Decarbonize the Electricity Sector in Indonesia In Indonesia, the government has committed to achieving net zero by 2060 and has plans to retire coal power plants, although these plans are conditional on international financial support.41 Indonesia has not curated a coal phase-out roadmap, the 2021-2030 National Electricity Plan continues to rely on coal power, and its ban on coal exports has been lifted.42 Despite these challenges, the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) Secretariat, a government initiative, provides an opportunity for nonprofits to influence policies, support the dissemination of off-grid renewables in remote areas, and increase community participation.43 Our understanding is that the JETP Secretariat is of a collaborative nature and routinely holds consultations with civil society groups and trade unions.44 We think that nonprofits could leverage their expertise to increase community participation and help shape the political agenda.
Both the Indian and Indonesian governments prioritize electricity transition, and there are specific areas where nonprofits can make significant contributions.45 By focusing on the electricity sector, we aim to address the largest source of emissions in both countries and leverage the potential for impactful action through collaboration with governments and other key stakeholders, such as academia, utilities, renewable energy companies, and industry alliances.
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1 Note: We adopted the World Bank Atlas method to classify countries based on their income level as High-Income Countries (e.g. Belgium, Chile, Saudi Arabia), Upper-Middle Income Countries (e.g. Botswana, Ecuador, Serbia), Lower-Middle Income Countries (e.g. Haiti, Nepal, Senegal) and Low-Income Countries (e.g. Chad, Rwanda, Yemen). (World Bank Group , 2024); Income-level categorization: “For the current 2025 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,145 or less in 2023; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1,146 and $4,515; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $4,516 and $14,005; high-income economies are those with more than a GNI per capita of $14,005. Table: BY INCOME.” (World Bank Group , 2024)
2 “Chart: Share of global cumulative CO₂ emissions” (Our World in Data , 2022)
3 “Per capita CO2 emissions, 2022” (Our World in Data , 2022)
4 “The average person in high-income countries emits more than 30 times as much as those in low-income countries.” (Ritchie , 2023)
5 “First, carbon emissions are higher per person in high-income countries, while low-income countries emit hardly any carbon at all. Some efforts to mitigate carbon emissions are most cost-effective when emission levels are high. For example, a US office building is typically kept at a lower temperature in summer than a comparable building in a poorer country. Insulating the US building has more payoff in reduced energy use, because the cooling use is more intense. The same reasoning applies more broadly to legal and regulatory change; for example, the reduction in carbon emissions that results from passing regulation to limit emissions from cars will be higher in countries with higher car ownership, all else equal.” (Glennerster & Jayachandran , 2023)
6 “For example, to keep within 2 degrees of warming, high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low-income countries will need emissions reductions of 39 percent, 30 percent, 8 percent and 8 percent, respectively, by 2030. To stay below 1.5 degrees of warming would entail more drastic emissions cuts of 60 percent and 51 percent for high- and upper-middle income countries.” (Black et al. , 2023)
7 “Emerging markets and developing economies (henceforth “EMDEs” in this chapter), even when excluding China, will account for the majority of the world’s annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2040.” (Bhattarcharya et al., 2023)
8 “According to the data from the World Bank, the highest growth in CO2 emissions based on income groups was observed among middle-income countries, where carbon emissions have increased by more than 130% over the period 1960–2016, compared to 40% in high-income countries.” (Majewski et al. , 2022); “Electricity consumption in emerging markets and developing countries is projected to grow at around three times the rate of developed countries (IEA 2022).” (Hartwich & Farnleitner, 2024)
9 “Chart: Share of global CO₂ emissions” (Our World in Data , 2023)
10 “The CO2 emissions normalized for populations in middle-income countries for the years 2000–2016 are plotted in Figure 1 . Evidently, there is a rising trend of carbon emissions, which seems to follow economic growth trends, demographic changes and other socio-economic processes that were taking place in this group of nations.” (Majewski et al. , 2022)
11 Emission increase in MICs: “However, a rapidly rising share of global emissions going forward will come from middle-income countries, and thus, policymakers in high-income countries argue that these countries should also bear some cost of and responsibility for action on their part.” (Glennerster & Jayachandran , 2023); Link between GDP and GHG emissions: “In recent years, several researchers have discovered a link between GDP and greenhouse gas emissions” (Furkan et al ., 2023); “In Figure 1, we use data from the 2018 World Development Indicators to document a strong correlation between a nation’s carbon emissions per-person and its average income per-person.” (Prasad , 2024)
12 “Rising incomes in middle-income countries will lead to a surge in demand for consumer durables, leading to rapid increases in the demand for electricity and energy.” (Kahn & Lall , 2023)
13 “A doubling of personal real income increases the probability of owning a vehicle by 9.6 percentage points (Kahn and Lall 2022). We find similar magnitude income effects for air conditioners and refrigerators, washing machines, cell phones, computers, and televisions.” (Prasad , 2024)
14 “As incomes rise, households will become increasingly mobile, and car ownership will begin to rise steeply. All this is to be expected as part of the development process. However, unless transport systems are increasingly decarbonized, the growth in transport-related emissions from developing countries can be expected to be steep .” (Ngulube & Foster , 2022)
15 “In particular, many mitigation investment opportunities require substantial inputs of land and unskilled labor, which can make the same type of mitigation activity less expensive in low- and middle-income countries than in high-income countries.” (Glennerster & Jayachandran , 2023)
16 “One reason for the mitigation bargains in low- and middle-income countries is that some cheap opportunities that are already being pursued in high-income countries remain untapped in low- and middle-income countries.” (Glennerster & Jayachandran , 2023)
17 Environmental regulations and economic growth: “Environmental regulations may reduce immediate economic performance by imposing additional costs and risks” (Cabelkova et al., 2023); Impact on cost, innovation, risk, productivity or profit: “TABLE 1. The effect of environmental regulations on economic performance—two opposing views.” (Cabelkova et al., 2023); “Governments and citizens in low- and middle-income countries will, understandably, prioritize spending on basic needs and promoting economic growth, which could raise their relatively low standard of living, over contributing to the global public good of protecting the planet’s health.” (Glennerster & Jayachandran , 2023)
18 “According to the World Bank’s classification of countries based on their Gross National Income (GNI) for the 2025 fiscal year, there are 26 Low-Income Countries, 51 Lower-Middle-Income Countries, 54 Upper-Middle-Income Countries and 86 High-Income Countries.” World Bank Group (accessed July 2025)
19 “Annual CO₂ emissions: Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from fossil fuels and industry. Land-use change is not included.” Our World in Data (accessed October 2025); “CO₂ emissions per capita: Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from burning fossil fuels and industrial processes. This includes emissions from transport, electricity generation, and heating, but not land-use change.” Our World in Data (accessed October 2025); “Country ratings,” World Data Lab (accessed October 2025)
20 World Data Lab provides 2050 projections for three scenarios (see appendix ). We opted to use the BAU scenario given our belief that countries’ current level of ambition as indicated in their Nationally Determined Contributions provides a weak signal of future emissions, and that philanthropic support may remain key to reaching countries’ climate goals.
21 Global Philanthropy Environment Index, 2025
22 To provide an example, Climate Policy Initiative provides estimates of both bottom-up country-level climate funding needs and regional (and sometimes country-level) climate funding, sometimes alongside top-down country-level estimates of funding need. In the case of South Africa, this leads to 2023 top-down estimates of overall climate funding and funding need of $7.5B and $30.8B (respectively), while CPI’s more recent bottom-up funding need estimates indicate that South Africa will need $7.1B for mitigation only (and $22.8B for climate mitigation and adaptation). Using the top-down estimate of annual climate funding and the bottom-up estimate of funding need would suggest that South Africa has exhausted its funding need. In many cases, CPI does not provide country-level estimates at all, in which case we performed bespoke searches.
23 For instance, the climate finance source we identified for Indonesia provides average annual figures from public and private financial institutions from 2015-2021, so the numbers for Indonesia are somewhat outdated. We are therefore less certain that the funding need meets the <50% criterion.
24 “Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025,” Climate Policy Initiative, 2025 (see discussion of CPI data in the appendix ); Figure 3, "Known foundation support to regions, sectors, and strategies, 2019 to 2023, USD millions" (p. 9), ClimateWorks, 2025
25 Note that all remaining countries that have been assessed by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) are rated as “insufficient,” “highly insufficient,” or “critically insufficient” with respect to their policies, targets, and actions toward meeting the 1.5C global goal, indicating that all will need support. CAT has not assessed Malaysia.
26 Giving Green, Country Prioritization 2025
27 “Bottom-up climate finance needs: The climate finance required by countries to reach their national climate targets, as stated in official documents such as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These needs include both the finance required to be raised domestically and the financial support required from international (public and private) sources. While some countries estimate their climate finance needs using predictive models aligned to a 1.5°C pathway, in most cases, bottom-up needs are derived from a list of costed mitigation and adaptation measures or projects countries aim to implement.” CPI bottom-up climate finance needs data (accessed July 2025)
28 “While there is not yet a globally accepted official definition of “climate finance needs”, CPI distinguishes between two types of needs…” CPI bottom-up climate finance needs data (accessed July 2025)
29 “The green energy transition aims to replace high-carbon fossil fuels with low-carbon clean energy. Clean energy mainly consists of low-carbon renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, hydro, bioenergy, geothermal, etc.” (Tian et al. , 2021)
30 “ CO2 emissions by sector, India, 2021” (International Energy Agency , n.d.)
31 “ CO2 emissions by sector, India, 2021” (International Energy Agency , n.d.)
32 “The Government of India has articulated and put across the concerns of developing countries at the 26th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Glasgow, United Kingdom. Further, India presented the following five nectar elements (Panchamrit) of India’s climate action: 1. Reach 500GWNon-fossil energy capacity by 2030.; 2. 50 per cent of its energy requirements from renewable energy by 2030.; 3. Reduction of total projected carbon emissions by one billion tons from now to 2030.; 4. Reduction of the carbon intensity of the economy by 45 per cent by 2030, over 2005 levels.; 5. Achieving the target of net zero emissions by 2070.” (Ministry of the Environment, Forest and Climate Change , 2022)
33 “From 2010 to 2015, China issued the highest number of climate policies. But from 2015 to 2022, India took the lead by issuing more than fifty climate change policies. These ranged from production-linked incentive schemes to policies that encourage the use of clean energy products such as rooftop solar energy.” (Sharma , 2024)
34 “India stands 4th globally in Renewable Energy Installed Capacity (including Large Hydro), 4th in Wind Power capacity & 5th in Solar Power capacity (as per REN21 Renewables 2024 Global Status Report).” (Invest India , 2024)
35 “To be sure, the central government has taken key policy decisions that can accelerate the electricity transition. Investments in key transmission projects to evacuate renewable energy, new regulations that aim to improve clean energy integration in the electricity grid, and reforms in the electricity markets aim to support India’s ambitious non-fossil fuel-based capacity addition targets as part of its National Determined Contributions. Concurrently, the central government has implemented several energy efficiency initiatives aimed at various sectors, including appliances, buildings and industries.” (IEEFA , 2024)
36 “The Indian government has implemented several policy measures to encourage renewable energy, including capacity targets, improvements to administrative processes and incentives for the domestic production of solar technologies, and ramping up the production of green hydrogen.” (Climate Action Tracker , 2023)
37 “Both domestic coal production and coal imports have reached record highs in 2023.” (Climate Action Tracker , 2023)
38 “While there is no plan for building additional coal capacity beyond what is under development until 2026-27, the latest electricity plan includes adding substantial new coal power capacity in the following five years, and the government is pushing for increased domestic coal production” (Climate Action Tracker , 2023)
39 “The progress of states in the electricity transition is far more uneven. Some states have developed progressive steps, such as boosting decentralised renewable energy deployment, promoting solar pumps for agricultural needs, and enhancing storage solutions to ensure more renewable energy in their electricity systems.” (IEEFA , 2024)
40 Evidence building is underfunded: “The energy sector, which receives the bulk of most funding across sectors, seemed most focused on implementation – that is funding moved towards deployment of solutions for end-beneficiaries (~39% for grassroot support) and testing out innovations in financing solutions, instead of evidence building.” (India Climate Collaborative, 2024); Most money flows to tangible social sector goals: “Although in recent years, domestic philanthropy has grown considerably to approximately $ 13 billion per annum, the funds flowing towards policy research do not attract much attention due to the lack of tangible short-term impacts. This is because domestic philanthropies have traditionally sought tangible social sector goals pertaining to activities in and around the community, workplace, and employees.” (Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation, n.d.)
41 Net zero by 2060: “Indonesia submitted its Long-Term Strategy for Low Carbon and Climate Resilience (LTS-LCCR) in July 2021, with a target of achieving net zero by 2060 or sooner, brought forward from its previously announced target year of 2070.” (Climate Transparency Report , 2022); International financial support: “At COP26, Indonesia signed a voluntary pledge on phasing out coal to be operationalised in two phases: retiring some coal power plants by 2031, with further plant retirements between 2036–2040. Final coal power plant retirement should take place between 2051–2060. International financial support is key to achieving these commitments.” (Climate Transparency Report , 2022)
42 “Despite pledging to phase out coal, there is no clear roadmap and, conversely, the 2021–2030 National Electricity Plan maintains Indonesia’s reliance on coal power, while a ban on coal exports has been lifted.” (Climate Transparency Report , 2022)
43 “While they play a substantial role in proliferating off-grid renewables in remote areas and increasing community participation, only a few research contributions looked at the specific influence of NGOs/CSOs on the Indonesia's national energy transition.” (Sekaringtias et al ., 2023)
44 “The JETP Secretariat routinely organizes outreach and consultation activities with key stakeholder groups, notably civil society and trade unions.“ (UNDP , n.d.)
45 India: “To be sure, the central government has taken key policy decisions that can accelerate the electricity transition.” (IEEFA , 2024); India: “Major steps taken by the Government to accelerate the Indian economy’s transition to one powered by green energy include: (...) Permitting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) up to 100 percent under the automatic route for renewable energy projects; Waiver of Inter State Transmission System (ISTS) charges for inter-state sale of solar and wind power for projects to be commissioned by 30th June 2025; Launch of Schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan (PM-KUSUM), Solar Rooftop Phase II, 12000 MW CPSU Scheme Phase II, etc.; Laying of new transmission lines and creating new substation capacity under the Green Energy Corridor Scheme for evacuation of renewable power” (PIB , 2023); Indonesia: “Analysis of the Net Zero Emission Roadmap (NZE) suggests that Indonesia’s net zero target can be achieved through the application of renewable energy (by sustainable resources), energy efficiency, electrification, and grid interconnection. Energy efficiency and electrification are top priorities to reduce emissions.” (AEER , n.d.); Indonesia: “The results of the study will be integrated in to the 2024 Update of the Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP), due to be completed by the end of the year. The JETP Secretariat published the first CIPP in November 2023, which outlines energy transition strategy and investment for the on grid power sector. This year, the CIPP Update will expand the scope to include off-grid power sector investments, as well as energy efficiency and electrification.” (JETP Secretariat , 2024)
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